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
 
                                                 
 THOMAS P. SCHLOSSER. Mr. Schlosser represents Tribes in fisheries, timber, water, 
energy, cultural resources, contracting, tax and federal breach of trust. He is a director of 
Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville, where he specializes in federal litigation, 
natural resources, and Indian tribal property issues. He is also frequently involved in tribal 
economic development and environmental regulation. In 1970s, Tom represented tribes 
in the Stevens’ Treaty Puget Sound fishing rights proceedings. Tom has a B.A. from the 
University of Washington and a J.D. from the University of Virginia Law School. Tom is a 
founding member of the Indian Law Section of the Washington State Bar Association and 
also served on the WSBA Bar Examiners Committee. Tom is a frequent CLE speaker 
and moderates an American Indian Law discussion group for lawyers at 
http://forums.delphiforums.com/IndianLaw/messages. He is a part-time lecturer at the 
University of Washington School of Law.  
Case synopses are reprinted or derived from Westlaw with permission of Thomson-West. 
For purposes of this article, the author has revised the synopses. 
 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014 
 
378 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ..........................................................379 
OTHER COURTS..............................................................................................379 
A. Administrative Law ....................................................................379 
B. Child Welfare Law and ICWA ..................................................385 
C. Contracting .................................................................................389 
D. Employment ...............................................................................394 
E. Environmental Regulations ......................................................395 
F. Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR ................................................398 
G. Gaming........................................................................................403 
H. Land Claims ...............................................................................408 
I. Religious Freedom ....................................................................409 
J. Sovereign Immunity and Federal Jurisdiction .......................411 
K. Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent ....................................................422 
L. Tax ...............................................................................................428 
M. Trust Breach and Claims..........................................................431 
 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014 
 
379 
 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 12–399, 133 S. Ct. 
2552 (2013) The prospective adoptive parents filed petition to adopt a 
child. The biological father, a member of an Indian tribe, opposed the 
adoption, and the Cherokee Nation intervened on his behalf. The Family 
Court denied petition of the prospective adoptive parents and required 
them to transfer child to father Prospective adoptive parents appealed. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court, 398 S.C. 625, 731 S.E. 2d 550, 
affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court held 
that the (1) Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) section conditioning 
involuntary termination of parental rights, for Indian child, on a showing 
regarding merits of continued custody of child by parent, does not apply 
where Indian parent never had custody; (2) ICWA section providing that 
party seeking to terminate parental rights to Indian child under state law 
shall satisfy the court, that active efforts have been made to provide 
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent 
breakup of Indian family, and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful 
does not apply where Indian parent abandoned Indian child prior to birth, 
and child had never been in Indian parent’s legal or physical custody; and 
(3) ICWA section providing placement preferences for adoption of Indian 
children does not bar a non-Indian family from adopting an Indian child 
when no other eligible candidates have sought to adopt the child. 
Reversed and remanded. 
OTHER COURTS 
A. Administrative Law 
2. Gila River Indian Community v. U.S., No. 11-15631, 2012 
WL 3945301, 2013 WL 2171652 (9th Cir. 2012) City of Glendale and Gila 
River Indian Community brought actions challenging Department of 
Interior’s decision to accept property in trust for benefit of another tribe. 
State legislative and executive branch leaders intervened as parties 
Plaintiff, and the Tohono O’Odham Nation intervened as party Defendant. 
The district court, 776 F. Supp. 2d 977, granted summary judgment for the 
government, and the city and other parties appealed. The appellate court 
held that (1) Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act 
created a cap only on land held in trust for the tribe, not on total land 
acquisition by the tribe under the Act; (2) Department of Interior’s 
interpretation of Act so as to exclude parcel located on a county island 
fully surrounded by city land from city’s corporate limits was reasonable; 
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and (3) Act was valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Indian 
Commerce Clause. Affirmed. 
3. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Department of the 
Interior, et al., No 10-2052, 2012 WL 4373449 (D.D.C. 2012). The 
Jicarilla Apache Nation brought action, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), against Department of the Interior (DOI), 
challenging a decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). The 
court determined that DOI had jurisdiction of the notice of review of 
noncompliance issued against an energy company--based on its failure to 
comply with an order to perform (OTP). The OTP directed the energy 
company to recalculate royalties due to tribe on oil and gas leases. The 
company intervened, and all parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The court held that DOI’s determination that it had jurisdiction to consider 
the challenge to the energy company’s underlying liability was entitled to 
substantial deference. Plaintiff’s Motion denied and Defendants’ and 
Intervenor’s Cross-Motions granted. 
4. George v. United States, No. C 11–06159, 2012 WL 
4755038 (N.D. Cal. 2012) Plaintiff Laura Lee George challenged the 
denial, by the Assistant Secretary Indian Affairs (AS–IA), of her appeal 
from a determination, by the Superintendent of the Northern California 
Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs, rejecting her application for enrollment 
in the Hoopa Valley Tribe under the Hoopa–Yurok Settlement Act, 25 
U.S.C. § 1300i, et seq. Plaintiff George challenged the AS–IA’s decision 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Before the Court 
were the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. The court 
granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiff’s 
Motion. 
5. Cachil Dehe Band Of Wintun Indians of the Colusa 
Indian Community v. Salazar, et al., No. 12-3021, 2013 WL 417813 
(E.D. Cal. 2013) Before the Court were three Applications for Temporary 
Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions. The first was filed by 
Plaintiff Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian 
Community (Colusa). The second was filed by the United Auburn Indian 
Community of the Auburn Rancheria (UAIC). The third was filed by Stand 
Up for California!, Citizens for a Better Way, and Grass Valley Neighbors. 
The Citizen Plaintiffs also sought a writ of mandamus. Each application 
sought to prohibit Defendants Kenneth Lee Salazar, Secretary and the 
U.S. Department of the Interior from accepting a parcel of land into trust 
for the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise). 
Enterprise also sought to intervene as a defendant in the lawsuit. At the 
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heart of this litigation are two decisions by Defendants to take a parcel of 
land near Olivehurst, California into trust for Enterprise (Proposed Site) in 
order to construct a gaming facility. Pursuant to the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A), Defendants were 
required to proceed through a “two-step determination” before taking land 
into trust for Enterprise. The § 2718(b)(1)(A) exception permits such an 
acquisition if the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) consults with state, 
local, and nearby tribal officials and determines that the acquisition will be 
in the best interests of the tribe and not detrimental to the surrounding 
community. Section 2718(b)(1)(A) requires that the Governor of the state 
concur in the Secretary’s determination. On September 1, 2011, Assistant 
Secretary of Indian Affairs Echo Hawk signed a Record of Decision (ROD) 
that the § 2718(b)(1)(A) exception was met with respect to the Proposed 
Site. Simultaneously, AS–IA Echo Hawk sent a letter to California 
Governor Brown, requesting his concurrence. Governor Brown concurred 
by letter dated August 30, 2012 and Defendant Washburn signed another 
ROD on November 21, 2012 and published it in the Federal Register on 
December 3, 2012 announcing Defendants’ decision to acquire the 
Proposed Site in trust for Enterprise. Plaintiffs collectively opposed the 
acquisition of the Proposed Site based on alleged violations of the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, the Clean Air Act, and the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Plaintiffs sought to preserve their challenges by enjoining 
Defendants’ transfer of the Proposed Site into trust so that the merits of 
their challenges can be considered. Plaintiffs argued that the threat that 
their suit will be barred by the federal government’s sovereign immunity 
once the Proposed Site is transferred into trust necessitates injunctive 
relief. Defendants took the position that a 2012 Supreme Court case, 
Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 
made it clear that the QTA does not bar lawsuits like Plaintiffs’ and there 
was therefore no reason to delay the transfer because the transfer would 
not divest this Court of jurisdiction to review Defendants’ actions and strip 
title from the government if appropriate. 123 S. Ct. 2199 (2012). The Court 
denied Plaintiffs’ Motions for Temporary Restraining Orders; ordered that 
Defendants and Enterprise provide a 30-day notice to the Court prior to 
commencing any activity at the Proposed Site.  
6. Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, No. 11–5328, 2013 WL 
675009 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Tribe brought action challenging United States 
Department of the Interior’s (Department) refusal to recognize it as an 
Indian tribe. The District Court, 813 F. Supp. 2d 170, granted Interior’s 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and denied tribe’s Summary 
Judgment Motion. The Muwekma Ohlone tribe appealed the District 
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Court’s decision.  On appeal, the appellate court held that (1) Department 
did not violate petitioning tribe’s equal protection rights or act arbitrarily 
and capriciously in summarily recognizing other tribes outside the Part 83 
process but not doing the same for petitioning tribe; (2) whatever due 
process interest Indian tribe might have had as a previously-recognized 
tribe disappeared because that previously-recognized tribe no longer 
existed; and (3) Interior’s final determination denying tribal recognition was 
not arbitrary and capricious. Affirmed. 
7. Hansen v. Salazar, et al., No. C08-0717, 2013 WL 1192607 
(W.D. Wash. 2013). Hansen, as Chairwoman of the Duwamish Tribe, 
alleged that Defendants’ denial of Plaintiffs’ petition for federal 
acknowledgement as an Indian tribe violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act and Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights. Following the 1978 adoption of the 
Department of the Interior (Department) regulations in 25 C.F.R. part 83, 
the Department returned the Duwamish Tribe’s previously-filed petition for 
acknowledgement. The Duwamish submitted a documented petition in 
1987 and a revised petition in 1989. In 1994 the Department promulgated 
revised acknowledgement regulations. The Duwamish elected to have its 
petition evaluated under the 1978 regulations. On the last day of the 
Clinton administration, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, 
Michael Andersen, revised a proposed final determination to approve the 
Duwamish petition under both the 1978 and 1994 regulations. However, 
that determination was not published in the Federal Register and in 2001 
the new Assistant Secretary made a final determination declining to 
acknowledge the Duwamish and considering the Duwamish petition only 
under the 1978 regulations. However, in a similar context, the Assistant 
Secretary made a final determination in favor of recognition of the Chinook 
Indian Tribe, considering the tribe’s petition under both the 1978 and 1994 
regulations. The Department offered no reasons for the different treatment 
of the two petitions. Of the 15 petitioners the Department has declined to 
acknowledge since the 1994 regulations were adopted, the Duwamish are 
the only group whose petition was not considered under those regulations. 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; the Department’s final 
determination is vacated and the matter is remanded to the Department.  
8. Villa v. Salazar, No. 12–1086, 2013 WL 1245759 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 28, 2013) Under the Administrative Procedure Act, Nicolas Villa, Jr., 
challenged the decision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to acquire in trust a 
parcel of land in Amador County, California, for Indian gaming purposes. 
Chief Villa alleged that Interior should not have acquired the land and 
should not have recognized the Ione Band of Miwok Indians as a “restored 
tribe” under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) because that group 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014 
 
383 
 
is unconnected to the tribe led by Chief Villa, called the Ione Band of 
Miwok Indians of California. Interior moved to transfer the case to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. For the 
following reasons, transfer will be granted. According to Chief Villa, the 
Ione Band of Miwok Indians applied to the Department of Interior 
(Department) in 2004 for an “opinion as to whether the Plymouth Tracts,” 
a 228–acre parcel of land in Amador County, “would qualify for gaming if 
[Department] agreed to acquire the lands in trust for its benefit” under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21. In 2006, an 
Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs determined that the Plymouth Tracts 
would qualify as “restored lands” under IGRA. Chief Villa contended that 
the Ione Band of Miwok Indians has not achieved the formal 
acknowledgement necessary to qualify as a “restored” tribe under IGRA 
and its regulations promulgated in 2008. Additionally, Chief Villa asserts 
that in 2009 Department “reverse[d] and withdr[ew]” the 2006 Solicitor’s 
opinion, concluding instead that the Ione Band of Miwok Indians is “not a 
restored tribe.”  Notwithstanding this disavowal, Department approved the 
acquisition in trust of the Plymouth Tracts in May 2012, relying on the 
2006 ruling and determining that “the group purporting to be the Ione Band 
of Miwok Indians [is] eligible to conduct gaming operations there on the 
basis of IGRA’s restored lands exception.”  The Department filed a Motion 
to Transfer Venue to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California, relying in large part on the fact that two similar cases 
are pending in that court. The Court found that the “consideration[s] of 
convenience and fairness” in this case weigh in favor of transfer to the 
Eastern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and granted 
Department’s Motion to Transfer.  
9. St. Germain, et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, et al., No. 
13–945, 2013 WL 3148332 (W.D. Wash. 2013. Before the court was 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Plaintiffs Rudy St. 
Germain and Michelle Roberts are members of the federally-recognized 
Nooksack Indian Tribe of Washington (the “Tribe). They are also members 
of the Tribe’s eight-person Tribal Council. Plaintiffs are also among 
approximately 300 Nooksack members whom the Tribe may soon strip of 
their Nooksack membership, or “disenroll.”   On March 1, the Council 
passed Resolution No. 13–38, which commenced proceedings to amend 
the Tribe’s Constitution to remove a clause that grants membership in the 
Tribe to “[a]ny person who possesses at least one-fourth (1/4) degree 
Indian blood and who can prove Nooksack ancestry to any degree.”  
According to Plaintiffs, the disenrollment proceedings and constitutional 
amendment, if successful, would not only strip them (and 300 others) of 
Nooksack membership, it would eliminate the only provision of the Tribe’s 
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Constitution that would give them an alternative basis to claim 
membership in the Tribe. The Tribe’s Constitution requires amendments to 
be approved “in an election called for that purpose by the Secretary of the 
[Department of] the Interior . . . .”  Plaintiffs want to court to enjoin 
Defendants from “conducting the Secretarial Election set for June 21 . . . .”  
Plaintiffs advanced two substantive claims in support of their Motion:  that 
the Secretarial election violates the Reorganization Act, and that it violates 
the Administrative Procedures Act. The court found that Plaintiffs did not 
show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, or even serious 
questions going to the merits. Particularly, where a post-election challenge 
remains available, the public interest does not favor Plaintiffs. The court 
denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. 
 
10. Fort Belknap Housing Dep’t, et al. v. Office of Public and 
Indian Housing, No. 12–70221, 2013 WL 4017285 (9th Cir. 2013). (From 
the Opinion.)  This case involves a federal rent-subsidy program for Indian 
Tribes and Tribally Designated Housing Entities (TDHE) that lease 
housing to Indians. The program provides per-unit payments while the 
Tribe or TDHE is leasing housing units to Indians, with a view that each 
unit eventually be conveyed to the Indian lessees. When the Tribe or 
TDHE conveys a unit, or a unit becomes eligible to be conveyed, unless 
such a conveyance is impractical, the Tribe should no longer receive rent 
subsidy money for the unit. Here, the Fort Belknap Housing Department 
(Fort Belknap), a TDHE which received funds through the program, 
claimed and received rent subsidy payments for units that were no longer 
leased, but had been conveyed, and for units that were eligible to be 
conveyed. There were no circumstances which made the conveyance of 
such units impractical. After investigation, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) demanded the return of the overpayments it 
had made. Fort Belknap petitions this court for review of HUD’s decision to 
withhold the amount of overpayments from future program payments. Fort 
Belknap argues this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 4161(d) 
(2012). On the merits, it claims HUD’s actions in procuring repayment of 
the overpayments were “arbitrary and capricious” and based on a 
misinterpretation of various regulations. Section 4161(d), however, allows 
an appeal only when HUD takes action pursuant to § 4161(a). Because 
HUD has taken no action pursuant to § 4161(a), we lack jurisdiction to 
entertain this appeal and dismiss Fort Belknap’s petition without reaching 
the merits. 
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11. Board of Commissioners of Cherokee County, Kansas v. 
Jewell, et al., No. 08–317, 2013 WL 3828661 (D.D.C. 2013) In 2008, the 
Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma opened the Downstream Casino Resort, a 
large complex that straddles the borders of Kansas, Missouri, and 
Oklahoma. The actual casino is situated on a plot of land, the Meh-No–
Bah allotment, acquired by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) and 
the tribe by means of the Indian Land Consolidation Act. The Meh–No–
Bah allotment dates from 1895. In 2007, the Secretary purchased four of 
the five undivided interests in the Meh–No–Bah allotment. She did not 
perform any environmental review of the acquisition. The tribe purchased 
the remaining one-sixth interest. In 2008, the Downstream Casino Resort 
opened on the forty-acre plot allotted to Meh–No–Bah more than a 
hundred years before. It has been in continuous operation ever since. The 
Board of Commissioners of Cherokee County, Kansas, where another 
portion of the casino complex is located, filed suit several months before 
the casino opened to invalidate the Secretary’s land acquisition and to 
force the National Indian Gaming Commission to determine whether the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act permits the Quapaw to operate a casino on 
the land in question. The Board of Commissioners alleged, first, that the 
Secretary violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by failing to 
determine whether the Meh–No–Bah allotment was eligible for gaming 
before acquiring it, and that the National Indian Gaming Commission was 
obligated to make that determination before allowing the casino to open. 
The Board also alleged that the Secretary failed to comply with the 
National Environmental Policy Act, the land into-trust regulations and her 
own internal policies when she acquired the fractional interests in the 
Meh-No–Bah allotment. The court concluded that the NIGC is not required 
to issue a determination as to the gaming eligibility of the Meh–No–Bah 
allotment, and that the Board of Commissioners has not established its 
standing to challenge the Secretary’s decision to take that land into trust, 
because it has not shown a substantial probability that a judgment it its 
favor would redress its injuries.  
 
B. Child Welfare Law and ICWA 
12. In re Christian P., No. B236528, 2012 WL 2990034 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012). County Department of Children And Family Services 
(DCFS) filed dependency petition. The Superior Court sustained 
jurisdictional allegations. The mother of the child appealed the Superior 
Court’s decision. On appeal, the appellate court held that (1) attorney for 
DCFS was not required to petition for access to files in other children’s 
dependency case; (2) hearsay allegations against mother were 
adequately corroborated; (3) evidence supported finding that mother’s use 
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of methamphetamines rendered her incapable of caring for children; but 
(4) DCFS failed to give adequate ICWA notice. Reversed and remanded 
with directions. 
13. In re H.R., No. A134137, 2012 WL 3568325 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012) Dependency proceeding was commenced regarding Indian child. 
The Superior Court selected traditional state law adoption as the 
permanent plan and terminated parental rights. The Indian tribe appealed 
the Superior Court’s finding. On appeal, the appellate court held that 
(1) tribal customary adoption order did not necessarily preclude trial court 
from selecting a different permanent plan, and (2) tribal customary 
adoption was preferred as child’s permanent plan. Reversed and 
remanded. 
14. In re A.W., J060417; 10136J; J010086; 10137J; A149947, 
2012 WL 3594662 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). Mother and father appealed from a 
combined dispositional and permanency judgment of the Circuit Court 
changing the permanency plan of two children, one being an “Indian child” 
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), from reunification to adoption. 
The appellate court held that (1) evidence established that the Department 
of Human Services (DHS) made active efforts to reunify Indian child with 
mother; (2) evidence established that DHS made reasonable efforts to 
reunify second child with mother; but (3) evidence failed to establish that 
DHS made active efforts to reunify Indian child with father. Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
15. In re Anthony T., No. D061309, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 124 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012). County health and human services agency filed 
dependency petition. Father’s tribe intervened. The Superior Court, No. 
NJ14540, placed child in foster care with an Indian family. Mother and 
child appealed. The appellate court held that foster home placement was 
not “within reasonable proximity to” child’s home under Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA). Reversed. 
 
16. In re Interest of Zylena R. and Adrionna R., children 
under 18 years of age, State of Nebraska, appellee and cross-
appellee, v. Elise M., appellant, and Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 
intervenor-appellee and cross-appellant, Nos. S–11–659, S–11–660, 
284 Neb. 834 (Neb. 2012).  The State of Nebraska filed petitions to 
terminate the parental rights of mother and father to their purportedly 
Indian children. The Omaha tribe intervened and sought transfer of 
proceedings to Tribal Court. The Juvenile Court denied transfer. Mother 
and tribe appealed. The appellate court, 2012 WL 1020275, affirmed. 
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Mother and tribe petitioned for further review. The Supreme Court held 
that (1)  foster placement and termination of parental rights proceedings 
involving an Indian child are separate and distinct under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act and should not be conflated in determining whether a 
“proceeding” is at an “advanced stage” such as to warrant denial of 
transfer of proceeding from state court to tribal court; abrogating, In re 
Interest of Louis S. et al., 17 Neb. App. 867, 774 N.W. 2d 416 (2009),  In 
re Interest of Leslie S. et al., 17 Neb. App. 828, 770 N.W. 2d 678 (2009); 
(2) termination of parental rights proceedings were not at an “advanced 
stage,” such as would warrant denial of transfer; and (3) state court is not 
permitted to consider best interests of an Indian child in deciding whether 
there is good cause to deny Motion to Transfer child custody proceeding 
to tribal court; overruling,  In re Interest of C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 479 
N.W. 2d 105. Reversed and remanded with directions to sustain the 
Motions to transfer the cases to the Omaha Tribal Court. 
 
17. State, ex rel., Children, Youth and Families Dept. v. 
Marsalee P., No. 31,784, 302 P.3d 761 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). Children, 
Youth and Families Department filed a neglect/abuse petition against 
mother. The District Court terminated mother’s parental rights, and she 
appealed. On appeal, the appellate court held that (1) children were not 
“members” of Navajo Nation, and as such, the children were not “Indian 
children” who were subject to Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); 
(2) Department failed to fulfill its statutory obligation under Abuse and 
Neglect Act to pursue enrollment on behalf of the children; and (3) district 
court erred by terminating mother’s parental rights before it ensured that 
Department had fully complied with section of Abuse and Neglect Act. 
Reversed.  
 
18. In re K.T., a Minor, No. 3–12–0969, 2013 IL App (3d) 
120969 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). State filed juvenile petition alleging that child, 
who was a member of Indian tribe, was neglected. Mother moved for 
continuance to allow tribe to enter case. The Circuit Court denied Motion 
and proceeded to dispositional phase, naming child as ward of court and 
finding that child should remain in custody of Department of Children and 
Family Services (DCFS). Mother appealed. On appeal, the appellate court 
held that notice provided to Indian tribe was insufficient under Indian Child 
Welfare Act. Reversed and remanded. 
 
19. In re Guardianship of K.B.F., No. 43922, 2013 WL 
2606570 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). Following adjudication of child as 
dependent, child’s maternal grandparents filed guardianship petition. The 
Superior Court granted petition, and father appealed. As matter of first 
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impression, the Court of Appeals, held that (1) juvenile court lacked 
authority to convert dependency proceeding to one for guardianship, 
absent showing as to which reunification services were actually court-
ordered, and not just offered to father; and (2) Department of Social and 
Health Services was required to continue to make reasonable efforts 
towards child’s reunification with father, despite decision to convert 
dependency proceeding to one for guardianship, until guardianship was 
actually established. Vacated and remanded. 
20. Native Village of Tununak v. State of Alaska, et al., No. 
S–14562, 303 P.3d 431 (Alaska 2013). After mother’s parental rights to 
Indian child were terminated, maternal grandmother and tribe sought to 
enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) placement preferences and 
child’s foster parents petitioned for adoption. The Superior Court granted 
foster parents’ petition for adoption. Tribe appealed the Superior Court’s 
decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that (1) statute that required 
placement with family member, unless there was clear and convincing 
evidence to deviate from, that placement preference did not apply to 
adoptive placement determinations; and (2) the ICWA required the clear 
and convincing standard of proof for departing from ICWA adoptive 
placement preferences. Reversed and remanded. 
21. In re S.E., Case No. B244326, 217 Cal. App. 4th 610, (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2013). County department of children and family services (DCFS) 
filed dependency petition. The Superior Court sustained jurisdictional 
allegations, denied reunification services, ordered that child be placed 
under legal guardianship with maternal grandparents, and terminated 
jurisdiction over the case. The parents of the child appealed the Superior 
Court decision. On appeal, the appellate court held that (1) DCFS was 
required to include child’s great-great-grandfather in Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA) notice, and (2) failing to investigate father’s alleged Indian 
heritage was prejudicial under ICWA. Reversed and remanded. 
22. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 2011–205166, 2013 WL 
3752641 (S.C. 2013). Prospective adoptive parents filed petition to adopt 
child. Biological father, a member of an Indian tribe, opposed adoption, 
and Cherokee Nation intervened. The Family Court denied petition and 
required prospective adoptive parents to transfer child to father. 
Prospective adoptive parents appealed the Family Court’s decision. The 
South Carolina Supreme Court, 398 S.C. 625, 731 S.E. 2d 550, affirmed. 
Certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court, 133 S. Ct. 
2552, reversed and remanded. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court held that (1) Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) placement 
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preferences did not apply, and (2) father’s consent to adoption was not 
required. Remanded. 
23. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, et al., No. 2011–205166, 
2013 WL 3820596 (S.C. July 24, 2013). Prospective adoptive parents filed 
petition to adopt child. Biological father, a member of an Indian tribe, 
opposed adoption, and Cherokee Nation intervened. The Family Court 
denied petition and required prospective adoptive parents to transfer child 
to father. Prospective adoptive parents appealed. The South Carolina 
Supreme Court, 398 S.C. 625, 731 S.E. 2d 550, affirmed. Certiorari was 
granted. The United States Supreme Court, 133 S. Ct. 2552, reversed and 
remanded. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court remanded, 
__ S.E. 2d __, 2013 WL 3752641, directing entry of order finalizing 
adoption and termination biological father’s parental rights. Biological 
father and Cherokee Nation filed petitions for rehearing, and biological 
father filed petition for supersedeas in which Cherokee Nation joined. The 
Supreme Court held that remand for entry of order finalizing adoption and 
terminating biological father’s parental rights was appropriate. Petitions 
denied. 
C. Contracting 
24. Yakama Nation Housing Authority v. United States, No. 
08–939C, 106 Fed. Cl. 689 (Fed. Cl. 2012). Indian nation’s housing 
authority (authority) brought action against United States, alleging that 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) improperly 
reduced Indian Housing Block Grants authority received under Native 
American Housing and Self–Determination Act (NAHASDA) over course 
of several years, and seeking to account for and recover purportedly 
withheld grant funds. The Court of Federal Claims, 102 Fed. Cl. 478, 
granted in part and denied in part government’s Motion to Dismiss. 
Authority moved to vacate, alter, or amend that order. The Court of 
Federal Claims held that authority stated separate claim for relief under 
NAHASDA section regarding remedies for non–compliance. Motion 
granted. 
25. Twenty-Nine Palms Enterprises Corporation v. Paul 
Bardos, No. E051769, 2012 WL 5458870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). Tribal 
project owner brought action against sole proprietor contractor and its 
owner, seeking to recover money on grounds that contractor was 
unlicensed and alleging unfair competition. The Superior Court, No. 
908132, entered summary judgment for tribal project owner, and owner 
appealed. The appellate court held that (1) contractor could not assert 
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defense that licensing statute was not enforceable in contract made with 
tribal entity for work done on tribal land; (2) court abused its discretion in 
making blanket ruling sustaining all objections to contractor’s declaration; 
(3) fact that owner was the responsible managing officer of a corporation 
with a contractor license did not allow owner to perform work under sole 
proprietorship’s name without an individual license; (4) alter ego and 
piercing the corporate veil doctrines did not apply to allow sole 
proprietorship to borrow corporation’s license; (5) sole proprietorship did 
not substantially comply with state contractor’s licensing statutes; and 
(6) conflict in evidence regarding estoppel was created solely by 
Defendants and did not show a genuine issue of material fact. Affirmed.  
26. Muscogee (Creek) Nation Division Of Housing v. U.S. 
Department Of Housing And Urban Development, et al., No. 11–7040, 
698 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2012). Indian tribe brought action against 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under 
Administrative Procedure Act, challenging limitation of investment of grant 
money, awarded under the Native American Housing Assistance and 
Self–Determination Act, to a period of no longer than two years. The 
district court, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1225, granted HUD’s Motion to Dismiss. 
Tribe appealed. On appeal, the appellate court held that (1) HUD did not 
exceed its statutory authority by promulgating requirement that 
investments of block grant funds not exceed two years in length; (2) court 
had subject matter jurisdiction to consider whether HUD was authorized to 
demand remittance of interest earned in violation of that requirement; and 
(3) HUD’s demand for remittance was consistent with federal law. 
Affirmed. 
27. Arctic Slope Native Association, LTD. v. Sebelius, No. 
2011–1485, 699 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Indian Self–Determination 
and Education Assistance Act contractor appealed from a decision of the 
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, 2011 WL 2570533, dismissing its 
breach-of-contract claim under the Contract Disputes Act as time-barred. 
The appellate court held that equitable tolling of statutory time limit for 
contractor’s breach-of-contract claim under the Contract Disputes Act was 
warranted. Reversed and remanded. 
28. Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C., No. S–13790, 
2013 WL 386373 (Alaska 2013). Law firm filed Motion for a Writ of 
Execution to enforce judgment against Alaska Native corporation. Alaska 
Native corporation moved for relief from the judgment. The Superior Court 
granted law firm’s Motion to Execute and denied Alaska Native 
corporation’s Motion for Relief from Judgment. Alaska Native corporation 
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appealed. The Supreme Court held that (1) as a matter of first impression, 
Alaska Native corporation did not waive its right to appeal trial court orders 
as a result of paying judgment for law firm after Writ of Execution was 
issued; (2) arbitration award for law firm violated provision in Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) prohibiting ANCSA attorney fee 
contingency contracts; (3) entry of judgment on arbitration award violated 
the ANCSA; (4) issuance of Writ of Execution violated the ANCSA; 
(5) Alaska Native corporation could recover sums paid to law firm after 
issuance of Writ of Execution; but (6) illegal judgment was not void; and 
(7) Alaska Native corporation could not recover fees paid to law firm prior 
to the issuance of the Writ of Execution on the ground that the judgment 
was released or discharged. Reversed in part and affirmed in part. See 
also 969 P.2d 1139, 545 F.3d 1161.  
29. Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v. ‘Sa’ Nyu 
Wa, Inc., No. 12-08183, 2013 WL 525490 (D. Ariz. 2013). Petitioner 
Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC (GCSD) filed an application for 
confirmation of an arbitration award. Respondent ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa, Inc. (SNW) 
filed a response and a Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award and to 
Dismiss the matter. GCSD is a limited liability company with its principal 
place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada. SNW is a tribally chartered 
corporation of the Hualapai Tribe with its principal place of business in 
Arizona. On December 31, 2003, the parties entered into a Development 
and Management Agreement (2003 Agreement) for the construction and 
operation of a glass viewing bridge (Skywalk) and related facilities at the 
south rim of the Grand Canyon on the Hualapai Indian Reservation. The 
2003 Agreement provides that “[a]ny controversy, claim or dispute arising 
out of or related to this Agreement shall be resolved through binding 
arbitration” pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. 
After the Skywalk opened to visitors in March of 2007, controversies arose 
between GCSD and SNW over such things as completion of 
infrastructure, bookkeeping, and payment of management fees. The 
arbitration proceeded with SNW’s participation until the Hualapai Tribal 
Council passed a declaration of taking by eminent domain of GCSD’s 
interests in the 2003 Agreement and the Tribe took physical possession of 
the Skywalk. The Tribe then submitted a declaration of taking to the 
Hualapai Tribal Court and requested that the court issue an order 
declaring that absolute title in GCSD’s contractual interests had vested in 
the tribe, subject to just compensation estimated to be about $11,040,000. 
The Tribe also requested a temporary restraining order to prevent GCSD 
from destroying or removing any property from the Skywalk, which the 
Tribal Court granted. The Tribe then filed a notice of dismissal in the 
arbitration action, attempting to dismiss GCSD counsel and GCSD’s 
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arbitration claims on the grounds that the taking had substituted the Tribe 
in the place of GCSD for all purposes under the 2003 Agreement. The 
arbitrator ruled that the parties to the arbitration remained the same and 
that the Tribe was a non-party and therefore without authority to dismiss 
the arbitration. The arbitrator ordered arbitration to proceed with a final 
hearing scheduled for April 2012. The court granted Petitioner Grand 
Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC’s application for confirmation of an 
arbitration award; denied Respondent ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa, Inc.’s Motion to 
Vacate the Arbitration Award and Dismiss the matter; and ordered 
Respondent ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa, Inc. to remit damages in the amount of 
$28,572,810.25 to Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC, as set forth 
in the August 16, 2012 Arbitration Order.  
30. Lac Vieux Desert Band Of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians Holdings Mexico, LLC., et al. v. Cardona, et al., No. 1-11–
0128, 2013 WL 1641316 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). Plaintiffs–Appellants Lac 
Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians and Lac Vieux 
Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians Holdings Mexico 
(collectively “Tribe) appealed the trial court’s dismissal of their Second 
Amended Complaint for insufficient service of process. In 2006, the Tribe 
loaned $6.5 million dollars to Defendants in exchange for a twenty-six 
percent share in the building and running of a casino venture in 
Guadalupe, Mexico. Among other claims, the Tribe asserted that 
Defendants failed to comply with the partnership agreement, failed to pay 
contractually obligated profits and converted funds. As part of the 
transaction, the parties made a Master Term Sheet and ultimately signed 
a Security Agreement, a Depository Agreement and a Pledge Agreement. 
The Master Term Sheet states the “Security and Depository Agreements 
shall be under the jurisdiction and laws of the State of Arizona, United 
States,” but also states the parties will submit all disputes to binding and 
final arbitration in Mexico. The Security Agreement says the “Mexican 
Counterparts,” a term defined as the Defendants other than Juan 
Cardona, consent to “the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Arizona” 
and agree “any action or claim arising out of, or any dispute in connection 
with, this Agreement . . . may be brought in the Courts of Arizona” and that 
service of process in any action may be made upon them by certified mail 
or international courier at a Nuevo Leon, Mexico address listed in the 
Security Agreement. The procedural history of this matter is complex. The 
Tribe raised four issues on appeal:  (1) It was error for the trial court to sua 
sponte dismiss the suit in its entirety, as Guadalupe Recreation Holding 
was not a party to the insufficient service Motion, was properly served and 
therefore remained a Defendant in the suit. (2) It was error to find the 
Hague Convention applied to service within the United States. (3) It was 
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error for the trial court to determine that service was insufficient on foreign 
Defendants’ domestic counsel given that service was court-ordered as 
“other means” service under Rule 4.2(i)(3) on domestic counsel. The Tribe 
asserts such service was valid and effective even if Attorney Davis was 
not an authorized agent. (4) It was error to dismiss the suit instead of 
permitting appellants to attempt re-service as there is no time deadline for 
foreign service. The appellate court reversed and remanded as to 
Defendant Guadalupe Recreation Holding. As to all other Defendants, it 
affirmed. 
31. Quantum Entertainment, Ltd. v. Department of the 
Interior, No. 12-5133, 2013 WL 1799002 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Quantum, 
which was engaged in the business of managing gas distribution 
businesses in New Mexico, entered into an agreement with a tribal 
corporation of the Santo Domingo Pueblo in 1996. Under the agreement, 
Quantum provided day to day operation of the business, maintained 
records and books of account, and exercised nearly exclusive control. The 
parties also covenanted not to have any interest in any other gas 
distribution businesses within New Mexico (with one exception). Quantum 
received an annual management fee of 49percent of net income and a fee 
based on each gallon of fuel sold. In 2003, the Pueblo determined that the 
agreement had never been approved and was too lucrative for Quantum. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs Regional Director declared the agreement 
never to have been legally valid under old 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2012). The 
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) agreed and concluded that 
applying new § 81 to the agreement would have an impermissible 
retroactive effect of “rendering valid an otherwise invalid contract.”  
Applying Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. The Court also agreed that the IBIA’s decision treating 
the Pueblo and its corporation together as a single party was not arbitrary 
or capricious.  
32. Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Lewiston Golf 
Course Corp., et al., 968 N.Y.S. 2d 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). Concrete 
and paving contractor brought action against, inter alia, corporation that 
was formed under laws of Seneca Nation of Indians, asserting causes of 
action for foreclosure of mechanic’s lien, breach of contract, breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, 
promissory estoppel, and fraud, in relation to contract to build golf course 
with associated driving range, club house, and pro shop. The Supreme 
Court denied corporation’s Motion to Dismiss on sovereign immunity 
grounds. Corporation appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division 
held that the (1) corporation was not arm of tribe, and thus was not entitled 
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to share tribe’s immunity from suit, and (2) contractor’s breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was duplicative of its breach of 
contract claim. Affirmed as modified. 
D. Employment 
33. Gilbertson v. Quinault Indian Nation, No. 11–35970, 2012 
WL 3877627 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2012). Plaintiffs filed Title VII action against 
Indian tribe. The District Court entered judgment on pleadings in tribe’s 
favor, and plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court held that the 
(1) statement in employee handbook did not constitute waiver of Indian 
tribe’s sovereign immunity, and (2) tribe’s limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity for suits in tribal court did not constitute waiver of such immunity 
for all purposes. Affirmed. 
34. Rivera v. Puyallup Tribe Of Indians, et al., No. 3:12–
05558, 2012 WL 4023350 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2012). Before the court 
was Defendants’ Puyallup Tribe of Indians Motion to Dismiss under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff Michelle Rivera 
presented claims arising from her termination as Director of the Tribal 
Council Office. Defendants Puyallup Tribe of Indians and the individual 
Tribal Council Members argued that there is no federal question 
jurisdiction, and they have sovereign immunity in federal court. Rivera 
argued that federal jurisdiction is appropriate because no other forum is 
available. Rivera alleged that Council members participated in a long-
standing pattern of abuse and belligerent behavior against her, 
culminating in the passage of a Tribal Resolution that reorganized her 
office and terminated her employment. Rivera, a Tribe member, filed suit 
in Puyallup Tribal Court. After all three Tribal Court judges recused 
themselves, Rivera filed suit in federal court. A judge pro tempore has 
since been appointed to hear the case in Tribal Court. The court granted 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and dismissed 
Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.  
35. Sanderford v. Creek Casino Montgomery, No. 2:12–455, 
2013 WL 131432 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2013) Plaintiff Pamela Sanderford 
brought suit against her employer, Defendant Creek Casino of 
Montgomery, after she was injured on the job. Defendant moved to 
dismiss on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity. The court found that it 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint because the 
Poarch Band of Creek Indians (Tribe) enjoys tribal sovereign immunity. As 
a threshold issue, Defendant Creek Casino is indistinguishable from the 
Tribe for the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity. The Tribe is a federally 
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recognized Indian tribe and enjoys sovereign immunity absent 
Congressional abrogation or waiver. Defendant is a gaming operation 
wholly owned and operated by the Tribe. Poarch Band of Cr. Ind. Code 
§ 20-1–1(d). It exists to fund and support, among other things, the Tribe’s 
“operations or programs,” the “general welfare of the Tribe and its 
members,” and “economic development.”  Poarch Band of Cr. Ind. Code § 
20–1–1(c). Accordingly, the court will treat the Tribe and the Casino as 
one and the same for immunity purposes. The motion to dismiss was 
granted.  
36. Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of Florida d/b/a Seminole 
Indian Casiono—Immokalee, No. 2:12–cv–411, 2013 WL 3350567 (M.D. 
Fla. 2013). Before the Court was the Motion of Seminole Tribe of Florida 
to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, for Failure to State a 
Claim for Relief, and Memorandum of Supporting Points and Authorities 
(Motion to Dismiss). The Court for the foregoing reasons granted 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.. Defendant, Seminole Tribe of Florida 
(Tribe) is a federally recognized Native American tribe doing business as 
Seminole Indian Casino (Casino). Plaintiff, Stephanie Mastro (Mastro) was 
hired by the Casino on or about November 2008 as a card dealer. The 
Casino is wholly owned and operated by the Tribe on restricted tribal trust 
land in reservation status within the geographical confines of Collier 
County, Florida. Mastro accused Defendant of sexual harassment and 
retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Florida 
Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing 
that tribal sovereign immunity prohibits the District Court from exercising 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff responded that under Title VII, 
Defendant is not cloaked with immunity, the Casino is a separate and 
distinct entity not subject to tribal immunity, and that even if sovereign 
immunity applies, Defendant has unequivocally waived its right to invoke 
its protections. The Court concludes that Defendant had not waived its 
sovereign immunity. The court (1) granted the Motion of Seminole Tribe of 
Florida to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to 
State a Claim for Relief; and (2) dismissed the case without prejudice.  
E. Environmental Regulations 
37. Native Village Of Kivalina, et al. v. Exxonmobil Corp., et 
al., No. 09–17490, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). Native Village of Kivalina 
is an Alaskan city located on tip of barrier reef. Native Alaskan tribe, 
members of which resided in city, brought action for damages under 
federal common-law claim of public nuisance, and dependent civil 
conspiracy claim, against multiple oil, energy, and utility companies. 
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Alleging that companies’ massive greenhouse gas emissions had resulted 
in global warming which in turn severely eroded land upon which city was 
situated. The District Court, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, granted companies’ 
Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs 
appealed the decision. On appeal, the appellate court held that Clean Air 
Act and agency action authorized thereunder displaced federal common 
law, precluding claim for public nuisance. Affirmed. 
38. Voices For Rural Living v. El Dorado Irrigation District, 
Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, Real Party in Interest and 
Appellant, No. C064280, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1096 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
Appellant petitioned for writ of mandate challenging irrigation district’s 
determination that its agreement to provide water to a casino located on 
tribal land was exempt from California Environmental Quality Act. The 
Superior Court granted petition. Appellant and tribe appealed. On appeal, 
The appellate court held that (1) fair argument standard of review applies 
to “unusual circumstances” exception to categorical exemptions; 
(2) project to provide water service to casino and hotel involved “unusual 
circumstances;” (3) there was a fair argument that providing water service 
could have significant effect on environment; but (4) ordering district to 
prepare environmental impact report exceeded trial court’s authority; 
but (5) district could not disregard allegedly unconstitutional local agency 
formation commission restrictions. Affirmed in part and reversed in part 
with directions. 
39. Friends Of The Everglades, et al. v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Nos. 08–13652, 08–13653, 08–
13657, 08–14921 and 08–16283, 699 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2012). 
Environmental advocacy organizations, nine states, Canadian province, 
and Indian tribe petitioned for review of final rule issued by Environmental 
Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. Part 122, creating permanent exemption 
from Clean Water Act (CWA) permit requirements for pollutants 
discharged from transfers of waters of United States. Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated petitions, and state water management 
district and sugar company intervened to defend water-transfer rule. On 
appeal, the appellate court held that (1) CWA jurisdictional provision 
governing effluent or other limitations did not apply; (2) CWA jurisdictional 
provision governing issuance or denial of permits did not apply; and 
(3) hypothetical jurisdiction could not be exercised. Petitions dismissed.  
40. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Hendry County, Florida, et 
al, No. 2D12–1657, 2013 WL 238231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Indian 
tribe filed petition for writ of certiorari, seeking to quash county ordinance 
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that rezoned land from general agriculture to planned unit development 
(PUD) for purpose of constructing natural gas power plant and solar 
energy farm. The Circuit Court denied petition. Tribe sought second-tier 
certiorari review. The District Court of Appeal held that (1) statute 
providing exclusive methods for party to challenge consistency of 
development order with comprehensive plan precluded tribe from raising 
in certiorari petition its claim that ordinance was inconsistent with 
comprehensive plan; (2) Circuit Court afforded procedural due process 
and applied correct law as to issues of compatibility of ordinance’s 
approved uses with adjacent Indian reservation; (3) limited scope of 
second-tier certiorari review precluded District Court of Appeal from 
deciding tribe’s claim that Circuit Court improperly reweighed the evidence 
regarding compatible uses; (4) local development code (LDC) did not 
require that water needs for proposed PUD be entirely self-contained; and 
(5) Circuit Court afforded procedural due process and applied correct law 
as to Indian tribe’s claim that ordinance violated LDC’s termination 
section. Petition denied. 
41. Center For Biological Diversity, et al. v. Salazar, et al., 
No. 11–17843, 2013 WL 440727 (9th Cir. 2013). Environmental 
organizations and Indian tribe brought action against Secretary of the 
Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), alleging that 
Defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act, and BLM regulations, by permitting 
mining company to restart mining operations at a uranium mine site, after 
a seventeen-year hiatus, under a plan of operations that BLM approved. 
The District Court, 791 F. Supp. 2d 687, and 2011 WL 4709874, granted 
two summary judgments in favor of Defendants. The Plaintiffs appealed 
the District Court’s decision. On appeal, the appellate court held that 
(1) approval of a new plan of operations was not required before regular 
mining activities could recommence; (2) issuance of a gravel permit to 
county, and requirements that mining company obtain a new air quality 
control permit, and approval of an updated reclamation bond before 
restarting mining operations, did not require supplementation of prior 
environmental analysis; and (3) invocation of categorical exclusion from 
environmental impact statement requirement for issuance of gravel permit 
was not arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. 
Affirmed. 
42. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. 
United States Dept. of the Interior, et al., No. 12-1167, 2013 WL 755606 
(S.D. Cal. 2013). Plaintiff, Quechan Tribe, filed a Complaint against 
Federal Defendants challenging the United States Department of the 
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Interior’s (Department) approval of the May 11, 2012 Record of Decision 
approving the Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility Project, a utility-scale wind 
power project in the Sonoran Desert in Imperial County, California. Plaintiff 
filed a First Amended Complaint, which added causes of action 
concerning events subsequent to the Record of Decision. Plaintiff then 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment; granted Federal Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment; and granted Defendant Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss and 
Summary Judgment.  
F. Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR 
43. United States v. Washington, No. 70-9213, Subproceeding 
11-02, 2012 WL 4846239 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Before the Court was a 
consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
Requesting Tribes, namely the Jamestown S’Klallam, Lower Elwha 
Klallam, and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribes. They requested that the Court 
grant summary judgment on the issues presented in their Request for 
Determination filed November 8, 2011. The Request for Determination 
asked the Court to find that the actions of the Lummi Nation for fishing in 
the “case area” is not in conformity with Final Decision # 1. The Lummi 
Nation opposed the Motion. The court granted the Motion.  
44. Ahtna Tene Nené v. Alaska Department Of Fish & Game, 
et al., Nos. S–13968, S–14297, 288 P.3d 452 (Alaska 2012). Resident of 
Athtna Tene Nené brought action against the State of Alaska, challenging 
amended system of distributing permits to subsistence hunters in a 
caribou and moose hunting area. Tribe intervened on the side of the State, 
and a private organization intervened on the side of the resident. The 
Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of resident and 
enjoined the hunt as unconstitutional, and awarded attorney fees to 
resident and organization. Tribe appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
held that (1) appeal from summary judgment was moot; (2) public interest 
exception to mootness doctrine did not apply; (3) issue of attorney fees did 
not warrant Supreme Court to consider merits of otherwise moot appeal; 
and (4) resident was not an attorney and, thus, could not recover attorney 
fees. Appeal dismissed, and attorney fees award partially vacated. 
45. In re. Yakima River Drainage Basin, No. 86211–7, 2013 
WL 865457 (Wash. 2013). Department of Ecology filed an action seeking 
a general adjudication of the surface water in the Yakima River Basin. The 
Superior Court entered order determining the parties’ water rights to creek 
that was part of basin. Parties appealed. The appellate court transferred 
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appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that (1) decision in 
action brought by United States as trustee for Indian tribe in United States 
v. Ahtanum Irrigation District adjudicated the nontribal water rights of 
northside users; (2) federal court case did not preclusively determine the 
reservation’s practicably irrigable acreage; (3) trial court erred in denying 
the Indian reservation a right to store water from creek bordering 
reservation outside the irrigation season; (4) rights in excess water from 
creek could not be exercised by parties that were not confirmed a right in 
federal litigation; and (5) future development exception did not apply so as 
to give property owners water rights to creek after rights were relinquished 
by statute. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  
46. United States v. Washington, No. 70-9213, Subproceeding 
01-01, 2013 WL 1334391 (W.D. Wash. 2013). Plaintiff tribes asked the 
Court to find that the State of Washington has a treaty-based duty to 
preserve fish runs and sought to compel the State to repair or replace 
culverts that impede salmon migration to or from spawning grounds. In 
2007, the Court ruled in favor of the tribes and declared that “the right of 
taking fish, secured to the tribes in the Stevens Treaties, imposes a duty 
upon the State to refrain or building or operating culverts under State-
maintained roads that hinder fish passage and thereby diminish the 
number of fish that would otherwise be available for tribal harvest.”  In 
2009, the Court held a trial on remedies. The Court found that 1,000 to 
3,000 miles of freshwater spawning and rearing habitat is blocked by 
barrier culverts. Given the rate of replacement since trial, it would take the 
State more than 100 years to replace the significantly blocking culverts 
that existed in 2009. The number of barrier culverts with significant 
potential habitat in the Northwest and Olympic regions had increased 
since trial. The blocking culverts are responsible for a demonstrable 
portion of the diminishment of salmon runs. The Court issued a 
Permanent Injunction requiring the State Department of Transportation to 
provide fish passage at identified culverts by 2030. Other State agency 
culverts shall be repaired by 2016.  
47. Western Montana Water Users Association, et al. v. 
Mission Irrigation District, et al., No. 13-0154, 2013 WL 1428631 (Mont. 
2013).  Western Montana Water Users Association (Association) brought 
action against irrigation districts seeking to enjoin irrigation districts from 
entering into a water use agreement with Indian Tribes without submitting 
the final agreement to a vote of irrigators and receiving court permission. 
The district court issued a writ of mandate and injunction enjoining 
irrigation districts from entering into the water use agreement. The 
Irrigation districts appealed. The Supreme Court held that (1) district court 
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improperly issued a mandate and injunction on the basis that the terms of 
the water use agreement exceeded the districts’ authority, as none of the 
parties made any arguments regarding the issue of the districts’ authority, 
and (2) statutes did not require the districts to obtain member and court 
approval before entering into the water use agreement with Indian Tribes. 
Reversed.  
48. Native Village of Chickaloon, et al. v. National Marine 
Fisheries Service, et al., No. 3:12–cv–00102, 2013 WL 2319341, (D. 
Alaska 2013). Native Village of Chickaloon and environmental council 
brought action challenging National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) 
issuance of “Incidental Harassment Authorization” that allowed corporation 
to conduct seismic surveys in inlet designated as critical habitat for certain 
marine mammals, including the endangered Cook Inlet beluga whale, and 
alleging violation of Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The District Court held that 
(1) determination that seismic surveys would only take small numbers of 
beluga whales was not arbitrary and capricious; (2) beluga whale take 
calculations were arbitrary and capricious; (3) NMFS’s use of a take 
threshold of 160 decibels for harassment for beluga whales in inlet was 
reasonable, supported by the record, and entitled to deference; 
(4) determination in biological opinion that significant disruption to 
behavior patterns would not occur to any beluga whales during seismic 
surveys was not arbitrary and capricious; and (5) NMFS relied on 
inaccurate assumptions with respect to takes when determining whether 
environmental impact statement (EIS) was required under NEPA. Motion 
granted in part and denied in part.  
49. People of the State of New York v. Smith, No. 13–CV–
0428, 2013 WL 3305381 (E.D. N.Y. 2013). State of New York charged 
member of Shinnecock tribe with misdemeanor possession of undersized 
bay scallops. After removal, state moved to remand. The district court held 
that (1) state’s prosecution of tribal member for misdemeanor possession 
of undersized bay scallops did not implicate federal statute providing for 
racial equality, and (2) tribal member failed to establish that he was denied 
opportunity to enforce federal civil rights in state court. Motion granted. 
50. John, et al. v. U.S., Nos. 09–36122, 09–36125, 09–36127, 
2013 WL 3357880, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 2013). State of Alaska and various 
environmental organizations brought action challenging rules promulgated 
by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture identifying 
which navigable waters within Alaska constituted “public lands” under 
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Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), and thus 
entitled to a priority given to rural Alaska residents for subsistence hunting 
and fishing on such lands. The District Court upheld the rules, and 
Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court held that (1) Secretaries 
appropriately used notice-and-comment rulemaking, rather than 
adjudication, to identify those waters that were “public lands” for the 
purpose of determining the scope of ANILCA’s rural subsistence priority; 
(2) Secretaries reasonably concluded that adjacent waters were 
appurtenant to, and could be necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of, 
the federal reservations identified in the 1999 rule; (3) Secretaries did not 
act arbitrarily or contrary to law in refusing to extend the federal rural 
subsistence priority to waters upstream and downstream from federal 
reservations. Affirmed. 
51. United States v. Washington, No. 9213, 2013 WL 3421838 
(W.D. Wash. 2013). The Makah Indian Tribe filed a Request for 
Determination, asking for a determination of the Usual and Accustomed 
Fishing Grounds ((U & A) in the Pacific Ocean of the Quinault Indian 
Nation ((Quinault) and the Quileute Indian Tribe ((Quileute). Before the 
Court was a Motion by the Makah for partial Summary Judgment. The 
Motion was opposed by the Quinault and the Quileute, as well as the Hoh 
Indian Tribe as an Interested Party. The State of Washington, also an 
interested party under the procedures established in this case, also filed a 
Response to the Motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Makah 
Motion was substantially granted. The Request for Determination ((RFD) 
asserted that the Quinault and Quileute have been fishing (along with 
Makah and other Tribes) for salmon, halibut, groundfish, and highly 
migratory species of fish in the Pacific Ocean under regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the National 
Marine Fisheries Service ((NMFS). The Makah have been fishing for 
Pacific whiting in the offshore coast waters since 1996, under allocations 
or set-asides determined by NMFS. Beginning in 2008, the Quileute and 
Quinault informed NMFS that they intended to also participate in the 
Pacific whiting fishery. In response to this information, NMFS began the 
process to determine the “overall Indian treaty allocation in the Pacific 
whiting fishery.”  Because the whiting migrate from south to north, any 
fishing for this species by the Quinault or Quileute in the offshore waters 
south of the Makah U & A would have an impact on the Makah whiting 
fishery. The Makah sought to engage the Quinault and Quileute in 
management planning discussions for the whiting fishery in 2008 and 
2009 but the two tribes declined to participate. Makah then informed 
Quinault and Quileute that “the manner in which they proposed to 
participate in the pacific whiting fishery” would “trigger the need for a 
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judicial determination” of their U&A’s in the Pacific Ocean. According to 
the Makah, the western (offshore) boundary of the other tribes’ U&A’s 
“appears to be approximately 5 to 10 miles offshore . . . .”  If that is the 
case, asserted Makah, then the Quinault and Quileute have been 
conducting fisheries for salmon, halibut and black cod outside their U&A’s. 
The court granted the Makah Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
except as regarding whether Judge Boldt “specifically determined” the 
extent of the Quinault and Quileute U&A’s in Final Decision # 1. The Court 
directed the parties to again confer prior to further proceedings. 
52. United States v. Washington, et al., No. 70–9213, 
Subproceeding No. 05–04, 2013 WL 3897783 (W.D. Wash 2013). Before 
the Court were three pending Motions for Summary Judgment, Partial 
Summary Judgment, and Declaratory Judgment. The Tulalip Tribe filed a 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment, which is essentially a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the merits of their Request for Determination. The 
Suquamish Tribe, as responding party, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to its affirmative defenses. The extent of the usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds ((U&A) of the Suquamish Tribe was 
described in 1978 by the Honorable George Boldt as follows:  “The usual 
and accustomed fishing places of the Suquamish Tribe include the marine 
waters of Puget Sound from the northern tip of Vashon Island to the 
Fraser River including Haro and Rosario Straits, the streams draining into 
the western side of this portion of Puget Sound and also Hood Canal.”  
This Request for Determination, filed as Subproceeding 05–04 by the 
Tulalip, asks the Court to find that certain inland marine waters on the east 
side of Admiralty Inlet but west of Whidbey Island, as well as Saratoga 
Passage, Penn Cove, Holmes Harbor, Possession Sound (south to Point 
Wells), Port Susan, Tulalip Bay, and Port Gardner, do not lie within the 
Suquamish U&A as it was defined by Judge Boldt. The court  (1) denied 
the Suquamish Motion for Summary Judgment of dismissal of the Tulalip 
Request for Determination on grounds of judicial estoppel, res judicata 
and/or laches; (2) dismissed the Suquamish Counter–Request for 
Determination for failure to properly invoke the Court’s jurisdiction under 
Paragraph 25 of the Permanent Injunction; (3) granted the Swinomish 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and found that Saratoga Passage, 
Penn Cove, and Holmes Harbor are not included within the U&A of the 
Suquamish as described by Judge Boldt in April, 1975; and (4) granted in 
part and denied in part the Tulalip Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Declaratory Judgment. The Motion was granted as to Skagit Bay, 
Saratoga passage and its bays Penn Cove and Holmes Harbor, and as to 
Port Susan. The Court found upon review of the evidence that was before 
Judge Boldt that there was none presented that would have led him to 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014 
 
403 
 
include these waters within the Suquamish U&A. The Motion was denied 
as to Possession Sound, Port Gardner Bay, and the bays on the west side 
of Whidbey Island, specifically Admiralty Bay, Mutiny Bay, Useless Bay, 
and Cultus Bay. The Court found that there was reliable evidence before 
Judge Boldt from which he could find, and most likely did find, that the 
Suquamish fished these areas in treaty times.  
G. Gaming 
53. State of Michigan and Little Traverse Bay Bands of 
Odawa Indians v. Bay Mills Indian Community, No. 11–1413, 2012 WL 
3326596 (6th Cir. 2012). State of Michigan and Odawa Tribe filed action to 
prevent other Bay Mills Indian Community ((Defendant) from operating 
small casino on its property. The District Court entered preliminary 
injunction to stop Defendant from gaming. The Defendant appealed. The 
appellate court held that (1) proximity of two properties, along with 
likelihood that at least some gaming revenue from Defendant's casino 
otherwise would have gone to Plaintiff tribe through its casino, was 
enough to show injury in fact; (2) federal courts lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate claim under Regulatory Act, alleging that Defendant Indian 
tribe's casino violated Tribal–State compact, to extent that claim had been 
based on allegation that Defendant's casino was not on Indian lands; 
(3) federal courts lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate claim under Regulatory 
Act, alleging that Defendant Indian tribe's casino violated Tribal–State 
compact, to extent that claim was based on allegation that Defendant's 
property had not been acquired by Secretary of Interior in trust for benefit 
of Defendant; (4) common law claims brought by State of Michigan 
against Indian tribe to prevent it from operating small casino, which 
depended on whether casino was located on Indian lands, arose under 
federal law, as required for federal question subject matter jurisdiction; 
(5) Defendant was immune from suit on common law claims brought by 
State of Michigan to prevent tribe from operating small casino, which 
depended on whether casino was located on Indian lands, unless 
Congress had authorized suit or tribe waived its immunity; (6) provision of 
Regulatory Act that supplied federal jurisdiction and abrogated tribal 
immunity did not abrogate Indian tribe's sovereign immunity over claims 
that did not satisfy all textual prerequisites of Act; (7) inferential logic that 
federal statute governing gambling in Indian country abrogated sovereign 
immunity of Indian tribes with regard to gaming not conducted under 
approved Tribal–State gaming compact was not sufficient to abrogate 
tribe's sovereign immunity with regard to such gaming; and (8) tribal 
gaming ordinance waiving immunity only for tribal commission did not 
result in waiver of Indian tribe's immunity. Vacated and remanded.  
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54. New Gaming Systems, Inc. v. National Indian Gaming 
Commission, et al., No. CIV–08–0698, 2012 WL 4052546 (W.D. Okla. 
2012). Gaming machine lessor brought action against National Indian 
Gaming Commission ((NIGC), its chairman and vice chairman, the Sac 
and Fox Indian Nation, and Nation’s business enterprise, seeking judicial 
review of NIGC’s final decision under Administrative Procedure Act, that 
machine lease and promissory act constituted a management contract 
under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ((IGRA). The court held that 
(1) IGRA implementing regulation was not void for vagueness; (2) NIGC’s 
construction of IGRA in issuing implementing regulation was not contrary 
to clear congressional intent; (3) lessor was not entitled to a hearing prior 
to NIGC’s final decision; and (4) machine lease and promissory note 
constituted a “management contract” for the operation of a gaming facility 
within the meaning of IGRA. Affirmed.  
55. City Of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band Of Lake Superior 
Chippewa, Nos. 11–3883, 11-3884, 2013 WL 141725 (8th Cir. 2013). City 
of Duluth sued Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa ((Band), 
alleging breach of contractual obligations created when city and Band 
agreed to establish casino in city’s downtown, and also seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief. After it was compelled to arbitrate amount 
of withheld taxes owed to city, tribe moved for relief from final order. The 
District Court, 830 F. Supp. 2d 712, granted in part and denied in part 
Band’s Motion for Relief, and Band appealed. On appeal, the appellate 
court held that (1) city’s only avenue for challenging National Indian 
Gaming Commission’s ((NIGC) determination, that agreement between 
band and city violated “sole proprietary interest” provision of Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act ((IGRA:), was under the Administrative Procedure 
Act; (2) NIGC’s determination that agreement violated IGRA permitted 
court to grant prospective relief from future enforcement of the agreement; 
and (3) rule providing relief from a final judgment for any reason justifying 
relief permitted retroactive relief from decision requiring that band pay 
withheld taxes. Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. 
56. Outsource Services Management, LLC v. Nooksack 
Business Corporation, No. 67050–6, 2013 WL 149876 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2013). This was a breach of contract action by Outsource Services 
Management, LLC against Nooksack Business Corporation ((NBC), a 
tribal corporation of the Nooksack Indian Tribe. The Whatcom County 
Superior Court denied NBC’s omnibus Motion to Dismiss based on 
C.R. 12(b)(1), (2), and (6). Because NBC expressly waived its sovereign 
immunity in this action on contract. On appeal, the appellate court held 
that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction of the case. 
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Moreover, the loan and other agreements between the parties were not 
“management contracts,” which are void and unenforceable under the 
provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Accordingly, the appellate 
court found that the superior court has personal jurisdiction over NBC. The 
appellate court affirmed the amended order denying the omnibus Motion 
to Dismiss.  
57. Colombe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, et al., No. 11-3002, 
2013 WL 211275 (D.S.D. 2013). Plaintiff Charles Colombe, a shareholder, 
director, and officer of BBC Entertainment, Inc. ((BBC) filed a Complaint 
against Defendants Rosebud Sioux Tribe ((Tribe), Rosebud Sioux Tribal 
Court, and Judge Sherman Marshall (collectively “Defendants). Both 
parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Colombe’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
sought a ruling that the Supreme Court of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe lacked 
jurisdiction to determine that the oral modification of a casino management 
contract was invalid. Colombe contended that summary judgment is 
proper because the Tribe sued in Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court based on 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ((IGRA) and IGRA does not create a 
private cause of action. Colombe requested this Court vacate the Tribal 
Court judgment for lack of jurisdiction and prevent action to satisfy the 
Tribal Court judgment. Defendants opposed Colombe’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment and filed their own Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Colombe’s Complaint. Defendants argued that the Tribal Court had 
jurisdiction to determine whether an oral modification to a management 
contract required approval by the National Indian Gaming Commission 
and to declare an unapproved modification contract void. The Court 
denied Colombe’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 
58. City Of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band Of Lake Superior 
Chippewa, No. 12-1324, 2013 WL 1500884 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
Appellant, the City of Duluth, challenged the dismissal of its breach-of-
contract claim against respondent, the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa ((Band), arguing that the district court erred by determining that 
(1) it did not have jurisdiction over the claim because the Band had only 
waived immunity with respect to claims asserted in federal court and 
(2) the city’s claims were not ripe because the contract at issue had not 
yet been breached. This appeal arose out of the legally complex 
relationship between the city and the band in relation to the Fond du Lac 
Casino in downtown Duluth. The casino was created as a result of several 
agreements reached between the city and band in 1986 ((the 1986 
agreements). The agreement included a limited waiver of the band’s tribal 
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sovereign immunity, consenting to jurisdiction in Minnesota state or 
federal court:  In 1994, in response to a determination by the National 
Indian Gaming Commission ((NIGC) that the 1986 commission agreement 
violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ((IGRA), the city and Band 
negotiated a new set of agreements ((the 1994 agreements). Under the 
1994 agreements, the Band subleased the casino property back from the 
commission, and the commission assigned rent payments—calculated as 
a percentage of casino profits plus one dollar—to the city. The NIGC 
approved the 1994 agreements as consistent with IGRA, and the federal 
district court entered a consent decree. The 1994 agreements included 
two provisions relevant here: a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and a 
dormancy clause. In the waiver, section 9 of what the district court refers 
to as the umbrella agreement, the Band consented to jurisdiction only in 
federal district court in Minnesota. In December 2011, the city became 
aware that the Band had purchased and sought to put in trust a parcel of 
land near the casino. The city brought a breach-of-contract claim in state 
District Court. The city moved for temporary injunctive relief; the Band 
opposed the Motion, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 
the 1994 waiver of sovereign immunity and, alternatively, that the Band 
had not breached the agreement and thus that the controversy was not 
ripe. As part of determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the 
District Court will be required to make findings regarding the city’s 
likelihood of success on the merits. The District Court’s decision 
dismissing the case reflects its plain-language interpretation of the 
commission agreement’s definition of “Indian County” to preclude the city’s 
claim. But we conclude that, when read in the context of the entire 
agreement, the “Indian Country” definition is ambiguous. Accordingly, on 
remand, the District Court should consider all available evidence of the 
parties’ intent and may, in its discretion, reopen the record to consider 
more recent developments that may bear on intent. Reversed and 
remanded. 
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59. Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. Washington, No. C12–
688, 2013 WL 2253668 (W.D. Wash. 2013). This matter came before the 
court on Plaintiff, the Tulalip Tribes of Washington’s, motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff 
seeks a declaration that the State is in violation of the Tribal–State 
Compact, and an injunction requiring the State to execute an amendment 
with Plaintiff incorporating Tulalip’s proposed amendment. Defendant 
argues that Rule 19 requires dismissal, and that even if the case could 
proceed without joinder of other tribes, the plain language of the compact 
does not authorize the requested amendment. Having reviewed the 
memoranda, supporting documents, and the record herein, the court 
denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted Defendants’ 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.  
60. The Picayune Rancheria Of Chukchansi Indians v. 
Rabobank, et al., No. 1:13–cv–00609, 2013 WL 2434705 (E.D. Cal. 
June 4, 2013). This case is an offshoot of an ongoing dispute between two 
factions within the Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (the “Tribe), 
a federally recognized Indian Tribe. Among other things, the Tribe, 
through the Chukchansi Economic Development Authority ((CEDA), 
operates the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino, located in Coarsegold, 
California (the “Casino). To fund construction of the Casino, CEDA issued 
roughly $310 million in bonds. In 2012, CEDA restructured those debts by 
exchanging the original bonds for new ones issued under an Indenture 
Agreement between CEDA and Wells Fargo, National Association ((Wells 
Fargo). The Indenture Agreement required that CEDA deposit all 
revenues from the Casino’s operation into deposit accounts at Rabobank, 
and also required that CEDA, Wells Fargo, and Rabobank execute a 
“Deposit Account Control Agreement” ((DACA), which governs control of 
the Casino’s accounts. On March 21, 2013, one Tribal faction, led by 
Nancy Ayala and purporting to represent the Tribe ((Plaintiff” or the “Ayala 
Faction), filed suit against Rabobank in a judicial entity purporting to be 
the Picayune Rancheria Tribal Court (the “Ayala Tribal Court), alleging 
Rabobank breached its contract with the Tribe by failing to release to the 
Tribe funds maintained in the Tribe’s bank accounts. The Ayala Tribal 
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ((TRO) followed by a 
preliminary injunction ordering the Bank to pay a portion of the funds in the 
disputed accounts to bondholders; directing the Bank to interplead the 
funds remaining in the Accounts with the Tribal Court; prohibiting 
withdrawal of funds from the accounts except by order of the court; and 
establishing a procedure for withdrawal of the funds to pay the legitimate 
operating expenses of the Casino. On May 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Rabobank and three 
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members of the Tribe’s Tribal Council, Chance Alberta, Carl Bushman, 
and Reggie Lewis (the “Lewis Faction). In the federal action, Plaintiff 
sought to have the Court recognize and enforce the orders issued by the 
Tribal Court. On May 7, 2013, the Lewis Faction Moved to Intervene. That 
Motion, which is opposed by the Ayala Faction, is still pending. On June 3, 
2013, the Ayala Faction filed a request for a TRO, requesting that the 
court direct Rabobank to make a loan payment to Wells Fargo on behalf of 
the Tribe pursuant to the DACA and to interplead any funds remaining in 
the Disputed Accounts until such time as the Court can determine the 
merits of this case. Rabobank filed an opposition to the TRO request, as 
did the Lewis Faction by way of a special appearance. The court denied 
Plaintiff’s request for a TRO.  
H. Land Claims 
61. Ahtna, Inc. v. State of Alaska, Department of 
Transportation & Public Facilities, No. S-14075, 2013 WL 203070 
(Alaska 2013). State of Alaska brought quiet title action against state 
regional native corporation arising out of title dispute for road building 
material site. The Superior Court, granted summary judgment to State. 
Ahtna Corporation appealed the Superior Court’s decision. The Supreme 
Court held that (1) even if waiver of administration by federal Bureau of 
Land Management transferred administrative authority to corporation 
regarding road building material site, corporation did not have authority to 
cancel prior right-of-way grant to state for nonuse or abandonment; 
(2) state’s interest in site was an easement rather than a revocable permit; 
and (3) applicable version of federal highway regulation, allowing 
cancellation of easement for abandonment or nonuse, was preempted by 
provision of Federal Highway Act expressly authorizing state to determine 
when to terminate right-of-way. Affirmed. 
62. The Alabama–Coushatta Tribe Of Texas v. United States, 
et al., No. 2:12–83, 2013 WL 1279033 (E.D. Tex. 2013). Before the Court 
were “Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation” filed by The Alabama–Coushatta Tribe of Texas 
((Tribe). The Tribe objected to the recommendation that the Court grant 
the Motion to Dismiss filed by the United States based on a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for Failure to State a Claim was 
granted. The dispute traces back to before Texas joined the Union in 1845 
and concerns the claim by the Tribe to “aboriginal title” to millions of acres 
in what is known as the Big Thicket region of Texas, a substantial portion 
of which falls within the Eastern District of Texas. The Tribe was 
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successful in persuading Congress to order a Congressional reference 
proceeding before the United States Claims Court in 1983, which issued 
its non-binding report to Congress in 2000. See Alabama–Coushatta Tribe 
of Texas v. United States, No. 3–83, 2000 WL 1013532 (Fed. Cl. 2000). 
The report of the Court of Federal Claims contained a finding that the 
United States failed to properly discharge its fiduciary obligation to the 
Tribe to protect several million acres of aboriginal lands from trespass by 
settlers in the period before 1946, and recommended the payment of 
compensation by Congress. However, Congress has not acted upon that 
recommendation. This lawsuit does not seek to compel compensation for 
those pre-1946 trespasses, but asserts that the Tribe does have aboriginal 
title to certain lands currently owned by the Government, all falling within 
three federal enclaves: the Big Thicket National Preserve, the Davy 
Crockett National Forest, and the Sam Houston National Forest. The Tribe 
claims that its aboriginal title rights are recognized and protected by the 
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, better known as the 
Nonintercourse Act. At issue is the Government’s management of the 
extensive timber, oil and natural gas resources in three national forests 
and preserves. Congress has not provided the remedy that the Tribe 
seeks, which is ultimately a share of the revenues derived from the 
exploitation of these resources. That remedy can only be obtained from 
Congress.  
I. Religious Freedom 
63. Native American Council Of Tribes, et al. v. Weber, et al., 
No. 09–4182–KES, 2012 WL 4119652 (D.S.D. 2012). Native American 
organization and inmates brought action against Secretary of South 
Dakota Department of Corrections ((Department), alleging Department’s 
policy banning all tobacco from its facilities violated Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act ((RLUIPA). Following a bench trial, the 
district court held that (1) inmates’ use of tobacco was a religious exercise 
protected under RLUIPA; (2) policy placed a substantial burden on 
inmates’ exercise of their religious beliefs; and (3) policy was not 
supported by a compelling governmental interest. Ordered accordingly. 
64. The Navajo Nation v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 
et al., No. 11-08205, 2013 WL 530302 (D. Ariz. 2013). (From the Opinion)  
Pending before the Court was the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. This 
action stems from the long-standing desire of the Plaintiff, the Navajo 
Nation, to obtain the immediate repatriation of 303 sets of human remains 
and other associated cultural objects removed by the National Park 
Service ((NPS) from the Canyon de Chelly National Monument 
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((Monument). The Complaint alleges that since the establishment of the 
Monument, the NPS has dug up and carried off human remains and 
cultural objects from Canyon de Chelly and Canyon del Muerto, all without 
seeking or obtaining the consent of the Plaintiff, and contrary to the 
spiritual, religious and cultural practice of the Navajo people. In 
approximately 1996, the NPS began an inventory of these human remains 
and cultural objects in its collection pursuant to the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ((NAGPRA), 25 U.SC. § 3001 et 
seq., despite the demands by the Navajo Nation Historic Preservation 
Department that these items had to be returned to the plaintiff because 
they are the property of the Plaintiff inasmuch as they were removed from 
the plaintiff’s original treaty lands. The NPS, over the Plaintiff’s repeated 
objections, has recently begun a cultural affiliation process pursuant to 
NAGPRA in order to repatriate the human remains and cultural objects at 
issue to either the Navajo, Hopi, Zuni, or potentially some other tribe; the 
Plaintiff is participating in the NAGPRA process in order to protect its 
rights, while continuing to object to the process. On August 9, 2011, the 
Navajo Nation Department of Justice sent a written notice to 
Superintendent Clark of the Plaintiff’s intent to sue the NPS unless the 
NAGPRA process was immediately ceased and arrangements were made 
to return the human remains and cultural objects to the Plaintiff. In a 
responsive letter dated September 7, 2011, Superintendent Clark stated 
that it was the position of the NPS that the repatriation of the human 
remains and cultural objects could not be made prior to the completion of 
the tribal consultation and cultural affiliation process mandated by 
NAGPRA. The Court agrees with the Defendants that ARPA does not 
require that the NPS immediately repatriate the human remains and 
cultural objects to the Plaintiff. Since 16 U.S.C. § 470dd, the portion of 
ARPA relied on by the Plaintiff, does not specifically provide a 
nondiscretionary repatriation duty on the part of the defendants in the 
absence of any controlling regulation, the Court concludes that there has 
not been any withheld agency action that is reviewable under the APA at 
this time. The court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, to the extent 
that this action is dismissed in its entirety as barred by the sovereign 
immunity of the United States.  
65. Knight, et al. v. Thompson, et al., No. 12–11926, 2013 WL 
3843803 (11th Cir. July 26, 2013). Native American inmates brought 
action against Alabama Department of Corrections, challenging its short-
hair policy under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
((RLUIPA). The district court, 2012 WL 777274, entered judgment for 
Department, and inmates appealed. The appellate court held that 
(1) policy furthered compelling governmental interests in security and 
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discipline, and (2) policy was least-restrictive means of furthering those 
interests. Affirmed. 
J. Sovereign Immunity and Federal Jurisdiction  
66.  Siemion, dba/White Buffalo Ranch v. Stewert, et al., No. 
11–120, 2012 WL 1925743 (D. Mont. 2012). The United States Attorney 
for Montana, under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) and 28 C.F.R. § 15.4(a), has 
certified that Scott, Hugs, Stewart, and Ten Bear ((Federal Defendants) 
were acting within the scope of their employment with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs ((BIA) at the time of the incidents alleged in Siemion’s Amended 
Complaint. Doc. 43. The certification is “prima facie evidence that a 
federal employee was acting in the scope of her employment at the time of 
the incident[,]” Pauly v. U.S. Dept. of Agri., 348 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th 
Cir.2003) (quoting Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800 
(9th Cir.1995)). Siemion, as Plaintiff, bears the burden of disproving the 
certification by a preponderance of the evidence. Pauly, 348 F.3d at 1151. 
To disprove the certification, a court may allow a Plaintiff to conduct some 
discovery provided the Plaintiff has alleged “sufficient facts that, taken as 
true, would establish that the Defendants’ actions exceeded the scope of 
their employment.”  Iknatian v. U.S., 2010 WL 3893610, at 2 (D. Mont. 
Sept. 28, 2010) (quoting Stokes v. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 
2003)). Permitting such discovery, however, “must be balanced against 
the congressional intent ‘to protect federal employees from the uncertain 
and intimidating task of defending suits that challenge conduct within the 
scope of their employ.’”  Id., at 3 (quoting Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 
1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 1991)). Siemion has not met her burden. All of the 
allegations stem from the named Federal Defendants’ conduct taken 
pursuant to their employment. Siemion has not alleged, nor has she 
presented any evidence to demonstrate, that any act by any of these 
Federal Defendants was done in furtherance of their own personal interest 
or beyond what is ordinarily incidental to duties performed on behalf of 
their employer. Thus, the Federal Defendants’ Motion, to the extent it 
seeks to substitute the United States for Scott, Hugs, Stewart, and Ten 
Bear, is granted. The Court has carefully considered the parties’ 
arguments and relevant authority and concludes that the Tribal 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be granted. Siemion’s claims 
against Black Eagle and Cabrera are to be dismissed because they are 
immune from suit in their capacities as Tribal officials. Siemion’s claim 
against Tribal Defendants Tobacco, Snell, Wilhelm, Bends, V. Hill, and T. 
Hill are to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent 
that Siemion alleges that these named Tribal Defendants acted beyond 
their valid authority, Tribal sovereign immunity may not extend to them. In 
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this event, Siemion’s claim against them is appropriately dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction for a different reason. Civil jurisdiction 
over activities on reservation lands “presumptively lies in the tribal courts 
unless limited by federal statute or a specific treaty provision. 
Considerations of comity require the exhaustion of tribal remedies before 
the claim may be addressed by the [D]istrict [C]ourt.”  Here, the record 
does not reflect that Siemion has sought relief in Tribal Court for the claim 
she asserts here against these named Tribal Defendants, her Tribal Court 
case involved only the leasing dispute. Accordingly, her claims against the 
Tribal Defendants must be dismissed.  
67. Gilmore v. Weatherford, No. 11-5025, 2012 WL 3797736 
(10th Cir. 2012). Indian tribal members with restricted, undivided interests 
in mine tailings, or “chat,” that was being sold and removed by other 
parties who also had interest in chat brought cause of action against these 
other parties, as well as against the Secretary of the Interior and several 
Bureau of Indian Affairs officials, seeking to compel accounting, to obtain 
other equitable relief, and to recover on theory that private party 
Defendants were guilty of conversion in removing/selling chat without 
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The District Court, 748 F. Supp. 
2d 1299, dismissed claims against federal Defendants based on Plaintiffs’ 
failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, and later ruled, 2010 WL 
5462476, that it did not have federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 
accounting and conversion claims against private parties. Plaintiffs 
appealed. The appellate court held that (1) doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies applies as matter of judicial discretion to common 
law claims; abrogating Otoe–Missouria Tribe v. Kempthorne, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. 99548 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 2008); Tonkawa Tribe of Indians of 
Oklahoma v. Kempthorne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21484 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 
17, 2009); and Seminole Nation v. Salazar, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27836 
(E.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2009); (2) District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
requiring tribal members to first exhaust their administrative remedies, as 
prerequisite to pursuing claims against federal defendants in District 
Court; (3) state law accounting claim asserted by Indian tribal members 
against private parties who also had interest in chat was not claim over 
which District Court could exercise federal question jurisdiction; but 
(4) conversion claim necessarily presented a substantial question of 
federal law, regarding need for the Secretary to approve disposition of 
restricted Indian personalty, and was claim over which District Court could 
exercise federal question jurisdiction. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
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68. Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Seneca Gaming 
Corporation, et al., No. 12–00491, 99 A.D. 3d 1203 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2012). Sue/Perior Concrete, a contractor, brought action against Seneca 
Gaming Corporation, formed by Indian tribe to carry out its gambling 
operations, corporation’s wholly-owned subsidiary, past and present 
officers and/or directors of corporation and subsidiary, and member of 
tribal council who was officer of tribal-related entity, asserting claims for 
tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective 
business advantage, concerted action, and prima facie tort. The Supreme 
Court granted Motion to Dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity as to 
corporation and subsidiary, but denied Motion as to individual defendants. 
Individual Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, App. Div. held that 
individual Defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity. Reversed. 
69. Farmer Oil and Gas Properties, LLC v. Southern Ute 
Indian Triba, No. 12—cv-00313, 2012 WL 4856723 (D. Colo. 2012). 
Property owner brought action against Southern Ute Indian Tribe to 
resolve ownership of coalbed methane ((CBM) gas beneath parcel of land 
within tribe’s reservation. Tribe Moved to Dismiss. The court held that 
(1) tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity when tribe filed suit claiming 
ownership of CBM gas by virtue of its ownership of coal under parcel; 
(2) settlement agreement between Indian tribe and mining company did 
not constitute waiver of tribe’s sovereign immunity; and (3) res judicata did 
not preclude tribe from asserting ownership over CBM gas. Motion 
granted. 
70. Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, et al., No. 09–
8098, 697 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2012). Northern Arapaho Tribe ((NAT) 
brought action against state and county officials seeking injunction against 
state’s imposition of certain vehicle and excise taxes on Indians living in 
purported Indian country. City intervened, and Eastern Shoshone Tribe 
((EST) and United States were joined as third-party Defendants. The 
District Court, 660 F. Supp. 2d 1264, dismissed EST and United States as 
parties, and dismissed Complaint. NAT appealed. The appellate court held 
that (1) EST was required party; (2) EST’s sovereign immunity prevented 
its joinder; (3) District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
action for failure to join EST as indispensable party; and (4) dismissal was 
without prejudice. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 
71. People of the State of Michigan v. Collins, and People of 
the State of Michigan v. Mason, Nos. 300644, 300645, 2012 WL 
5233629 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). In these consolidated appeals, Defendant 
Stormy Dean Collins was charged with delivery of a controlled substance, 
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methylphenidate (Ritalin), MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(ii), and Defendant Rodney 
Farrell Mason was charged with possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance, marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii). The alleged 
offenses occurred inside an Indian casino, and neither Defendant is of 
Indian heritage. Although the District Court denied Motions by defendants 
to have the felony charges dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction, the 
circuit court, following bindover, granted renewed Motions for Dismissal 
that challenged the court’s jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings. The 
circuit court ruled that Michigan state courts lack jurisdiction in regard to 
offenses committed by non-Indians that take place on Indian lands 
situated within the state’s boundaries. The circuit court concluded that, in 
such situations, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The appellate 
court held that state courts in Michigan have jurisdiction relative to a 
criminal prosecution in which a non-Indian defendant committed a 
“victimless” offense on Indian lands or in Indian country and reversed and 
remanded for reinstitution of the charges against Defendants. 
72. United States v. Tsosie, No. CR-12-08147, 2012 WL 
6163075 (D. Ariz. 2012). Defendant Leander Tsosie filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The charges 
against Tsosie arose out of a car-pedestrian accident that occurred on the 
Navajo Indian Reservation. The pedestrian suffered severe injury and 
eventually died. The government alleged that Tsosie was the driver of the 
car. A grand jury indicted Tsosie under Arizona’s hit and run statute. See 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 28–661, 28-663. Section 28–661(A) provides that “[t]he 
driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of 
a person shall . . . immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 
accident or as close to the accident scene as possible but shall 
immediately return to the accident scene [, and r]emain at the scene of the 
accident until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of § 28–663.”  
Section 28-663 requires that the driver provide information and render 
assistance to the injured person, and criminalizes failure to comply with its 
provisions. Tsosie asserted that discovery revealed that the pedestrian 
was an Indian, and the government did not dispute that claim. The Court 
found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the indictment under 
the “Indian against Indian” exception to the Indian Country Crimes Act 
((ICCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and granted the Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment.  
73. United States ex rel. Howard and Weldy v. Shoshone 
Paiute Tribes, Duck Valley Indian Reservation, No. 2:10–01890, 2012 
WL 6725682 (D. Nev. 2012). Before the Court were Defendant Shoshone 
Paiute Tribes, Duck Valley Indian Reservation’s ((Defendant) Motion to 
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Dismiss and Plaintiffs Howard and Weldy’s Counter Motion to Treat 
Defendant’s Motion as One For a More Definite Statement. Defendant 
asserted that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because, as a federally-
recognized Indian Tribe, it is immune from suit, and alternatively, that 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint was not properly pled. This suit was a 
Medicare/Medicaid fraud case brought qui tam by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were 
former employees of the Owyhee Community Health Facility operated by 
Defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant was making false claims to 
the government in order to obtain increased Medicare and Medicaid 
payments in violation of the Federal Claims Act, ((FCA) 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(1), (2), and (7). Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of the United 
States government as authorized by the FCA. The Government elected 
not to intervene, and Plaintiffs continued to conduct the action on the 
Government’s behalf. The court granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.  
74. United States v. Duane Dale Big Eagle, No. 11–3754, 
2013 WL 105650 (8th Cir. Jan. 10, 2013). Duane Dale Big Eagle, 
defendant, was convicted in the District Court, 2011 WL 7462077, of 
conspiracy to commit bribery of an Indian tribal official, and aiding and 
abetting a bribery involving an agent of an Indian tribal government, and 
he appealed. The appellate court held that (1) admission of uncharged 
crimes evidence was reviewable only for plain error; (2) admission of 
uncharged crimes evidence was not plain error; and (3) Defendant waived 
right to challenge admission of evidence to extent prejudice would have 
been alleviated by curative instruction. Affirmed. 
75. United States v. Zepeda, No. 10–10131, 2013 WL 216412 
(9th Cir. 2013). Defendant, Zepeda, was convicted in the District Court of 
conspiracy to commit assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and use of a 
firearm during a crime of violence, and he appealed. The appellate court 
held that tribal enrollment certificate was insufficient to establish that 
Defendant was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under 
Major Crimes Act where the government introduced no evidence that 
Defendant’s bloodline was derived from a federally recognized tribe. 
Reversed and remanded.  
76. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement And Power 
District, et al. v. Lee, et al., No. CV-08–08028, 2013 WL 321884 (D. Ariz. 
2013). Pending before the Court were Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Parties. In 1969, Plaintiff Salt River Project 
Agricultural Improvement and Power District ((SRP) and other energy 
utilities entered into a lease with the Navajo Nation to construct and 
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operate an electrical power plant called the Navajo Generating Station 
((NGS), located near Page, Arizona, on the Navajo Reservation. The 
United States Secretary of the Interior granted SRP and the other utilities 
certain easements and rights-of-way (§ 323 Grant). The Secretary entered 
into the § 323 Grant to induce SRP and the others to proceed with the 
development of NGS. The 1969 Lease contains two clauses pertinent to 
this action. In section 16, “[t]he Tribe covenants that, other than as 
expressly set out in this Lease, it will not directly or indirectly regulate or 
attempt to regulate the Lessees in the construction, maintenance or 
operation of [NGS]” ((non-regulation clause). In section 18, SRP agreed to 
give preference in employment to local Navajos. In October 1985 the 
Navajo Nation enacted the Navajo Preference in Employment Act 
((NPEA). The impetus for the NPEA was the Navajo Tribal Council’s 
dissatisfaction with the lack of progress made over the years in employing 
and training Navajo people by companies doing business within the 
Navajo Nation. The NPEA is enforced throughout the Navajo reservation 
by the Office of Navajo Labor Relations ((ONLR) and the Navajo Nation 
Labor Commission ((NNLC). The NNLC conducts the hearings on NPEA 
Complaints filed by the ONLR and issues written decisions following those 
proceedings. The court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Parties; 
granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied Defendants’ 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
77. Beaulieu v. Minnesota Dep’t of Human Services, No. 
A10–1350, 2013 WL 331554 (Minn. 2013). Wallace Beaulieu, 
indeterminately committed as a sexual psychopathic personality and a 
sexually dangerous person, filed petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
alleging that his appellate counsel had provided him with ineffective 
assistance by failing to file a timely notice of appeal from commitment 
order. The District Court summarily dismissed petition. Offender appealed. 
The appellate court, 798 N.W. 2d 542, affirmed. Offender filed petition for 
further review. The Supreme Court held that (1) District Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction to civilly commit offender, an enrolled member of the 
Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe; (2) doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel did not preclude State from presenting at civil commitment trial 
evidence of conduct alleged in earlier criminal cases that ended in 
acquittals; and (3) offender failed to preserve for review claim that his right 
to trial by jury was violated. Affirmed. 
78. Maxwell v. County of San Diego, Nos. 10–56671, 10–
56706, 2013 WL 542756 (9th Cir. 2013). Shooting victim’s family 
members filed § 1983 action alleging that sheriff’s officers and tribal fire 
department and its paramedics unreasonably delayed in obtaining 
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appropriate medical treatment for victim, resulting in her death, and that 
officers unreasonably seized family members and employed excessive 
force. The District Court denied officers’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
and dismissed claims against tribal defendants. Parties filed cross-
appeals. The appellate court held that (1) officers who prevented victim’s 
ambulance from leaving crime scene were not entitled to qualified 
immunity; (2) officers were not entitled to qualified immunity with regard to 
unreasonable seizure claim; (3) summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds was not warranted with regard to excessive force claim; 
(4) summary judgment in supervisors’ favor on qualified immunity grounds 
was not warranted; and (5) paramedics for tribal fire department did not 
enjoy tribal sovereign immunity. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. Petitions for rehearing en banc denied. 
79. Allen, et al. v. Smith, et al., No. 12cv1668, 2013 WL 
950735 (S.D. Cal. 2013). Before the Court was the Amended Motion to 
Dismiss filed by Defendants Robert H. Smith, Leroy H. Miranda, Jr., Kilma 
S. Lattin, Theresa J. Nieto and Dion Perez ((Defendants). Twenty-seven 
former members of the Pala Band of Mission Indians ((Plaintiffs) filed a 
Complaint against Defendants, seeking monetary damages and 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs asserted the following claims for 
relief to remedy their disenrollment from the Pala Tribe (1) conspiracy to 
interfere with civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (2) deprivation 
of equal rights under the law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 
(3) conversion; (4) tortious interference with prospective economic 
advantage; (5) defamation; and (6) civil conspiracy. Defendants filed the 
Amended Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). The court found that the relief sought in 
the Complaint would “require affirmative action by the sovereign,” i.e. the 
Pala Tribe’s re-enrollment of Plaintiffs. Such a remedy would operate 
against the Pala Tribe, impermissibly infringing upon its sovereign 
immunity. Based upon the factual allegations of the Complaint and the 
nature and effect of the relief sought, the court concluded that Defendants 
acted in their official capacities and within the scope of their authority 
when they made the membership determinations at issue in this case. The 
court concluded that Pala is a separate sovereign and enjoys immunity 
that extends to the Defendants named in this case. Congress has not 
authorized this action and Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that the 
Tribe waived its immunity. The Complaint was dismissed on the basis of 
sovereign immunity.  
80. Dinger v. United States, No. 12–4002, 2013 WL 1001444 
(D. Kan. 2013). Plaintiff, Tammy Dinger, brought suit under the Federal 
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Tort Claims Act, alleging that her husband’s death was the result of the 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a tribal employee who was 
allegedly working under a grant from the federal government at the time of 
the accident. The United States requested that the court either dismiss the 
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, grant 
summary judgment in its favor. Mr. Dinger was driving his motorcycle on 
Kansas Highway 18 when Candace Wishkeno, a member of the Kickapoo 
Tribe, negligently drove her SUV into the pathway of Mr. Dinger’s 
motorcycle. Mr. Dinger crashed into the SUV, suffering fatal injuries. At the 
time of the accident, Wishkeno was employed by the Tribe as the 
Kickapoo Child Care Services Program Coordinator and Native 
Employment Program Coordinator. Dinger alleged that Wishkeno’s 
employment was pursuant to the Indian Self–Determination and Education 
Assistance Act ((ISDEAA). Dinger alleged that, at the time of the accident, 
the Tribe had entered into self-determination contracts with the Secretary 
of the Interior to plan, conduct, and administer programs for the benefit of 
Indians pursuant to the ISDEAA and the Tribe allegedly had a liability 
insurance policy that was issued in accordance with the ISDEAA, and 
included a provision waiving the Tribe’s right, as a federal entity, to 
sovereign immunity within the limits and coverage of the policy. Dinger 
asserted that Wishkeno and her SUV were covered by that insurance 
policy at the time of the accident. The court concluded that Dinger failed to 
show that Wishkeno was employed under a self-determination contract as 
defined in the ISDEAA. Consequently, the pleadings do not contain 
sufficient facts to establish that Wishkeno was a covered employee 
subject to liability under the FTCA. The Court granted the United States’ 
Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Dinger’s negligence claim against the 
United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
81. United States v. Alvirez, No. 11–10244, 2013 WL 1092709 
(9th Cir. 2013). Defendant, Alvirez, was convicted in the District Court of 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian reservation. 
Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that (1) Certificate of Indian 
Blood issued by Indian tribe was not admissible as self-authenticating 
document; (2) erroneous admission of Certificate was not harmless; 
(3) District Court’s refusal to exclude references to polygraph evidence did 
not deprive defendant of his constitutional right to present complete 
defense; and (4) District Court did not commit clear error in applying 
seven-level enhancement for infliction of permanent or life threatening 
bodily injury. Reversed and remanded.  
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82. Rodewald v. Kansas Department Of Revenue, No. 
105,098, 2013 WL 1173932, (Kansas 2013). Rodewald, who was 18 years 
old and a Native American, petitioned for judicial review of suspension of 
his driver’s license following his arrest for driving under the influence. The 
District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Department of 
Revenue ((DOR). Driver appealed. The Supreme Court held that 
(1) driving under the influence and implied consent statutes did not include 
roadways in Native American reservation over which tribal police assumed 
jurisdiction to enforce tribal law, and (2) DOR’s jurisdiction did not extend 
to roadways within Native American reservation. Reversed and remanded 
with directions.  
83. Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, et al. v. U.S. Department of 
the Interior, et al., No. 2:11-00995, E.D. Cal. 2013). Joseph Kennedy, 
Angela Boland, Grace Goad, Erick Mason, Hillary Frank, Madeline 
Esteves and Pauline Esteves filed their Second Amended Complaint 
((SAC) in this action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
Defendant United States Department of the Interior ((DOI) as a result of 
two DOI decisions issued by then DOI Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 
Larry Echo Hawk on March 1, 2011 ((EHD I) and July 29, 2011 ((EHD II) 
(collectively the “EHDs). Before the court was Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC. , The court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
for failure to join indispensable parties. The Court did not permit further 
leave to amend. The current lawsuit is the culmination of a long-standing 
dispute over the election and composition of the proper Tribal Council. 
While it is undisputed that in 2006 the Tribal Council consisted of Joe 
Kennedy, who was elected as Chairman, Ed Beaman, Madeline Esteves, 
Virginia Beck and Cleveland Casey ((2006 Council:), since then multiple 
factions have claimed to lead the Tribe. In May 2012, this court granted 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend, finding Plaintiffs failed 
to join indispensable parties. On May 29, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their SAC, 
realleging the five previous claims. Plaintiffs also added a sixth claim, 
alleging the DOI violated the Administrative Procedure Act ((APA) by 
discriminating against the Kennedy Council when the DOI installed the 
Gholson Faction to conduct the 2011 election. Plaintiffs now ask this Court 
to declare “that the [“EHDs”] violated the APA because they were made in 
a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not in accordance 
with law, violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process of law, 
exceeded DOI’s statutory authorities, and failed to comply with procedures 
required by law.”  In addition Plaintiffs added the Gholson council 
members as Defendants. Defendants responded by filing the present 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC in its entirety. Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss was granted without leave to amend. 
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84. State v. Youde, No. 68058–7–I, 2013 WL 2157687 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2013). (From the Opinion.)  “This case involves a prosecution for 
delivery of marijuana. The investigating agency was the police department 
of the Tulalip Tribes. The Tribes asserted sovereign immunity in response 
to a defense subpoena for information the Tribes deemed immaterial. 
Recognizing that a sovereign entity is not subject to compulsory process, 
the [S]uperior [C]ourt quashed the subpoena. The court then granted the 
[D]efendant’s [M]otion to [D]ismiss the prosecution. The State appeals the 
dismissal. We hold the court abused its discretion by dismissing the case 
without first determining whether the subpoenaed information was 
material. Because the record does not support a finding of materiality, we 
reverse the order of dismissal.”   
85. Tassone v. Foxwoods Resort Casino, et al., No. 12–2436, 
2013 WL 2396019 (2nd Cir. 2013). Appellant Tassone appealed from the 
judgment of the District Court granting Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 
Appellant’s Complaint asserted violations of Connecticut General Statutes 
§ 53–396, tortious breach of duty, premises liability, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, breach of contract, and violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. The 
appellate court concluded that the District Court properly held that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Defendants’ sovereign immunity. 
Tassone did not identify any express abrogation nor waiver of Defendants’ 
sovereign immunity with respect to individual citizens. The appellant court 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 
86. Magnan v. Trammell, et al., No. 11–7072, 719 F.3d 1159 
(10th Cir. 2013). Petitioner, Magnan, who pleaded guilty in Oklahoma 
state court to three counts of murder in the first degree and one count of 
shooting with intent to kill, and was sentenced to death, sought writ of 
habeas corpus. The District Ccourt denied the petition, and petitioner 
appealed. The appellate court held that Secretary of Interior’s approval of 
conveyance of surface interests in Indian land, as required by 1945 Act to 
extinguish the restrictions placed on the tract, were not met, and therefore, 
tract of land where crimes occurred constituted “Indian country,” and thus 
was not subject to jurisdiction of State of Oklahoma. Reversed and 
remanded. 
87. M.J. ex rel. Beebe v. United States, No. 11–35625, 2013 
WL 3285288 (9th Cir. 2013). Minor, represented by her mother and next 
friend, filed action against police officer and municipality, seeking over 
$100,000 in damages from officer and municipality for injuries minor 
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sustained as result of officer’s negligent driving of four-wheeler. United 
States Attorney for the District of Alaska “certified” that officer was 
deemed to be federal employee for purposes of lawsuit. The District Court 
granted summary judgment for municipality. Minor appealed. The 
appellate court held that (1) police officer was immune from tort liability by 
application of municipality’s sovereign immunity as Indian tribe and 
(2) municipality could not be held vicariously liable on “non-delegable 
duty” theory for negligent conduct of immune independent contractor. 
Affirmed. 
88. United States v. Loera, No. 3:13, 2013 WL 3298169 (D. 
Ariz. 2013). Defendant, Loera, was charged with misdemeanor offense of 
assault by striking, beating, or wounding an Indian on tribal land, and he 
moved to dismiss on ground that he was “Indian” not subject to such a 
prosecution in federal court. The District Court held that (1) while 
defendant barely satisfied “Indian blood” prong of test for Indian status, he 
did not satisfy “tribal or government recognition” prong, and thus did not 
qualify as “Indian;” and (2) term “Indian,” as used in statute authorizing 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over prosecutions arising out of 
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country, was 
used in narrow sense, as referring to enrolled members of Indian tribe. 
Motion denied. 
89. United States v. Livingston, No. 11–10520, 2013 WL 
4007541 (9th Cir. 2013). Defendant, Livingston, was charged with mail 
fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on 
Indian lands. The District Court, 2011 WL 347136, denied Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss the indictment and he was convicted on both counts. 
Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that (1) federal jurisdiction 
does not depend on proof that the gaming establishment at issue is 
located on Indian lands; (2) indictment sufficiently alleged theft by an 
officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands; 
(3) indictment sufficiently alleged mail fraud; and (4) evidence that 
defendant purchased golf bag and football helmet with funds from 
establishment was relevant. Affirmed. 
90. State of Idaho, et al. v. Native Wholesale Supply Co., No. 
38780, 2013 WL 4107633 (Idaho 2013). State of Idaho brought action 
against out-of-state Indian wholesaler, Native Wholesale Supply Co., 
((Wholesaler) for operating as a cigarette Wholesaler without a permit and 
for selling cigarettes that were unlawful for sale in Idaho. The District Court 
enjoined Wholesaler from selling wholesale cigarettes without a wholesale 
permit and assessed civil penalties. Wholesaler appealed. The Supreme 
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Court held that (1) Wholesaler was not required to obtain wholesaler 
permit; (2) State had subject matter jurisdiction to prevent non-compliant 
cigarettes from being imported; (3) Indian Commerce Clause did not 
preclude regulation; (4) trial court had personal jurisdiction over 
wholesaler pursuant to long-arm statute; and (5) exercise of personal 
jurisdiction comported with due process. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
K. Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent   
91. Schaghticoke Indian Tribe v. Rost, No. 33374, 2012 WL 
3930614 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). Schaghticoke Indian Tribe brought 
summary process eviction action to remove Defendant, Rost, from 
reservation land. The Superior Court entered judgment in favor of tribe. 
Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that (1) trial court had 
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate action, and (2) trial court did not 
improperly resolve any issues of tribal leadership. Affirmed. 
92. Wilbur v. Makah Tribal Court, No. 12-5484, 2012 WL 
4795667 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Before the Court was Respondent Makah 
Tribal Court’s ((Tribal Court) Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner James G. 
Wilbur ((Wilbur) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Tribal Court 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Wilbur’s petition for failure to exhaust tribal 
remedies and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Wilbur is a member of the Makah Tribe. The 
Tribal Court found Wilbur guilty of assault in the second degree, pursuant 
to Makah Law and Order Code 5.1.02 and in violation of the Domestic 
Violence Code § 11.1.04(e) and sentenced Wilbur to six months in jail and 
banishment from the reservation for one year after he completed his jail 
sentence. Wilbur filed a notice of appeal with the Tribal Court.  Wilbur 
failed to exhaust his Tribal remedies. The case was dismissed on the 
basis that Wilbur failed to perfect his appeal. Because the court dismissed 
the case based on failure to exhaust tribal remedies, it did not need to 
address the Tribal court’s argument that it is entitled to a 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal based on Wilbur’s failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. The court granted the Tribal court’s 
Motion to Dismiss.  
93. Valenzuela v. Silversmith, No. 11–2212, 2012 WL 5507249 
(10th Cir. Nov. 14, 2012). Alvin Valenzual, member of Tohono O'odham 
Nation, petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from tribal court 
convictions and his sentence. The District Court dismissed petition. 
Petitioner appealed. The appellate court held that (1) member was 
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required to exhaust his tribal court remedies before filing his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in federal court; (2) member had tribal court 
remedies that he had to exhaust; and (3) failure of member to file habeas 
petition in tribal court could not be excused from requirement to exhaust. 
Affirmed. 
94. Evans, et al. v. Shoshone–Bannock Land Use Policy 
Commission, et al., No. 4:12–417, 2012 WL 6651194 (D. Idaho 2012). 
Before the court were two Motions to Dismiss filed by the Defendants 
(collectively referred to as the Shoshone–Bannock Land Use Policy 
Commission (LUPC))), and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by 
Plaintiffs. The Shoshone–Bannock Tribes reside on the Fort Hall Indian 
Reservation that encompasses about 870 square miles. Plaintiff David M. 
Evans, not a member of the Tribes, owns land in fee simple within the 
boundaries of the Fort Hall Reservation. Evans constructed a single family 
residence on his property during 2012, and obtained a building permit 
from Power County authorizing the construction. Evans did not apply for or 
obtain a Tribal building permit. In June of 2012, the LUPC filed suit against 
Evans and the builders of his home in the Tribal Court. LUPC alleged that 
Evans and the builders had violated the Tribal zoning laws by failing to 
obtain a Tribal building permit for the home. Evans and the builders 
responded by filing this action against the LUPC and various individual 
tribal members of the LUPC and the Fort Hall Business Council. The 
Tribal Court stayed its action pending resolution by the court of the 
motions at issue. LUPC filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that Plaintiffs 
failed to exhaust their Tribal Court remedies and that the Tribal Court 
should, in the first instance, determine its own jurisdiction. LUPC filed two 
separate motions, one on behalf of the LUPC and the individual LUPC 
Defendants, and the second on behalf of the individual Business Council 
Defendants. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief to enjoin the 
Defendants from attempting to enforce Tribal ordinances against them. 
This Motion contains many of the same challenges to Tribal Court 
jurisdiction that were made in the Plaintiffs’ Response to LUPC’s Motions 
to Dismiss. The court found that the Plaintiffs must exhaust their Tribal 
Court remedies. The court granted the Motions to Dismiss, and dismissed 
the action without prejudice to the rights of Plaintiffs to re-file after 
exhaustion of Tribal Court remedies.  
95. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle 
Co., Inc., et al., No. 12-3021 (D.S.D. 2012).  This case is a continuation of 
a dispute that culminated in a decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 
U.S. 316 (2008). Approximately four years after the Supreme Court 
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released its opinion in Plains Commerce Bank, Defendants Long Family 
Land and Cattle Company, Inc., Ronnie Long, and Lila Long resumed 
litigation by filing an action in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court 
against Plaintiffs Plains Commerce Bank, Jerome Hageman, and Randy 
Robinson. Plaintiffs responded by starting this federal court action to seek 
to enjoin the Tribal Court action. This case and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment present a legal issue:  whether the court should 
decide now or defer in the first instance to the Tribal Court to determine 
the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Plains Commerce Bank on 
the underlying Tribal Court judgment. For the reasons explained in this 
Opinion and Order, this court defers decision at this time to the Tribal 
Court based on the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion and comity interests. 
The court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and declined to 
grant the relief requested in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  
96. McGuire, et al. v. Aberle, No. 26205, 2013 WL 175031 
(S.D. 2013). In 1967, Raymond and Margaret Becker’s eight children each 
inherited an undivided one-eighth interest in patented fee land located 
within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian 
Reservation. None of the Beckers are Indians. In 2006, one of the Becker 
children sold her undivided one-eighth interest to Patrick and Carletta 
Aberle. Patrick is a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. Sometime 
after Patrick and Carletta acquired their interests, a dispute arose between 
the Aberles and the Becker children who still retained an interest in the 
property. The Becker children commenced this action in circuit court, 
seeking a sale of the entire property. The Aberles counterclaimed for 
partition. Patrick also moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, arguing that because he was a member of the Tribe, and 
because he had become an owner of an undivided one-sixteenth interest 
in property on the Reservation, the circuit court possessed no subject 
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. The 
Aberles contended the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court had jurisdiction. 
The court denied the Motion to Dismiss, determining that the “ownership 
of fifteen-sixteenths of the property has continually been in the possession 
of [non-Indians,]” and therefore, state jurisdiction did not infringe upon 
tribal sovereignty. After a trial, the circuit court ordered a sale of the entire 
property. The Aberles appealed, contesting both South Dakota courts’ 
subject matter jurisdiction and the order of sale. The jurisdiction question 
must be resolved before addressing the merits. The appellate court 
remanded the matter to the circuit court to reconsider the jurisdiction 
question after further development of a factual record and consideration of 
the land alienation cases. The factual record should include:  identification 
of the Act of Congress under which the land was alienated; when the land 
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was patented; to whom it was patented; the subsequent history of title 
showing the extent of Indian and Tribal ownership; and the circumstances 
under which Patrick transferred his ownership interest to his son and 
subsequently reacquired that interest.  
97. In re Barth, et al., Bankruptcy Nos. 09–36006, 10–34267, 
10–38674; Adversary Nos. 11-03233, 11–03234, 11–03235, 2013 WL 
503652 (D. Minn. 2013). Chapter 7 trustee sought to compel turnover of 
monthly per capita payments that debtors would receive, in their capacity 
as members of Indian tribe. The Bankruptcy Court held that, to determine 
whether, on date that their Chapter 7 petition was filed, the bankrupt 
members of Indian tribe had any legal or equitable interest in the monthly 
per capita payments that they would receive in future as their share of 
revenue from gaming at Indian casino, such that these future per capita 
payments were included in property of the estate, Bankruptcy Court had to 
look not to Minnesota state law, but to Tribal law. Summary judgment 
granted for defendants. 
98. Window Rock Unified School District, et al., v. Reeves, 
et al., No. 12-08059, 2013 WL 1149706 (D. Ariz. 2013). Before the court 
were motions on whether the Navajo Nation had the regulatory and 
adjudicative authority to review personnel decisions made by the Plaintiff 
school districts. Plaintiffs Window Rock Unified School District and Pinon 
Unified School District are both Arizona political subdivisions. Pursuant to 
their mandates under Arizona constitutional and statutory law to educate 
all Arizona children, they operate public schools within that portion of the 
Navajo Reservation located within the State of Arizona on tribal land 
leased from the Navajo Nation. The Defendants are seven current or 
former employees of the Plaintiffs (employee defendants) and seven 
current or former members of the Navajo Nation Labor Commission 
(NNLC Defendants). At the time the action was commenced, the 
employee Defendants had Complaints pending before the Navajo Nation 
Labor Commission (NNLC), a tribal administrative tribunal, wherein they 
alleged that the school districts had violated their employment-related 
rights under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act (NPEA). The 
school districts, the Defendants in the NNLC cases, filed motions with the 
NNLC seeking the dismissal of the Complaints for lack of jurisdiction, 
contending that the NNLC had no regulatory or adjudicatory authority over 
personnel decisions made by Arizona public school districts located on the 
Navajo Reservation as a result of a ruling in Red Mesa Unified School 
District v. Yellowhair, 2010 WL 3855183 (D. Ariz. September 28, 2010). 
The NNLC ruled that it could resolve the tribal jurisdiction issue only 
through an evidentiary hearing held after the parties had engaged in 
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appropriate jurisdiction-related discovery. This action was commenced 
before the NNLC could hold its evidentiary hearing. In their Complaint for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, the Plaintiff school districts, who are 
indisputably non-Indians, alleged that the NNLC and the Navajo tribal 
courts lack jurisdiction over public school districts’ employment decisions 
and practices conducted on the Navajo Reservation. The Plaintiffs sought 
to have the court prohibit the employee Defendants from prosecuting their 
claims against the Plaintiffs in either the NNLC, the Navajo Nation 
Supreme Court, or any other Navajo forum, and prohibit the NNLC 
defendants from continuing to adjudicate the claims of the employee 
Defendants, as well as prohibit them from adjudicating any employment 
claims between the Plaintiffs and their employees. The court concluded as 
a matter of law that the Navajo Nation has no regulatory or adjudicative 
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff school district’s employment-related decisions 
underlying this action. Since tribal jurisdiction is lacking, the Court agreed 
that the NNLC Defendants should be barred from any further adjudication 
of its claims. The court denied the Navajo Nation Labor Commission 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Tribal Remedies and 
granted Plaintiffs’ Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment.  
99. Poulson, et al. v. Tribal Court For The Ute Indian Tribe 
Of The Uintah And Ouray Reservation, et al., No. 2:12–497, 2013 WL 
1367045 (D. Utah 2013). Petitioners Edson Gardner and Lynda Kozlowicz 
filed a paper captioned as a “Complaint Notice of Removal of Action, by 
Writ of Habeas Corpus from Ute Tribal Court.”  The Ute Indian Tribe’s 
Executive Director, with the approval of the tribal Business Committee, 
gave notice to Mr. Gardner and Ms. Kozlowicz that they were suspended 
from practice as lay advocates before the Ute Tribal Court for a period of 
ninety days, indicating that “[y]ou may be reinstated to practice as lay 
advocates on June 19,2013.”  The court found that the temporary 
suspension of one’s license to practice as a tribal court advocate is simply 
not the “custody” required to sustain habeas corpus proceedings. Such 
conditions and restrictions must significantly restrain one’s liberty in order 
to invoke § 1303 habeas jurisdiction. The court denied the petitioners’ 
request for lack of jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1303.  
100. Grand Canyon Skywalk Development, LLC v. ‘Sa’ Nyu 
Wa, Inc., No. 12 15634, 2013 WL 1777060 (9th Cir. 2013). Grand Canyon 
Skywalk Development (GCSD) entered into a contract with a tribally 
chartered corporation of the Hualapai Indian Tribe to build and operate a 
glass bottomed viewing platform suspended over the rim of the Grand 
Canyon. After a dispute arose, GCSD sued in Tribal Court to compel 
arbitration. While arbitration proceeded, the Hualapai Tribal Council 
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exercised imminent domain and condemned GCSD’s intangible property 
rights in the contract. GCSD sued in federal court seeking a declaration 
that the Tribe lacked authority to condemn its property rights. The District 
Court denied injunctive relief and required GCSD to exhaust Tribal Court 
remedies before proceeding in federal court. The Court of Appeals noted 
four recognized exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of tribal court 
remedies where (1) an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a 
desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) the action is patently 
violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions; (3) exhaustion would be 
futile because of the lack of an opportunity to challenge jurisdiction; or (4) 
it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of 
non-members’ conduct on fee land. The “bad faith” exception refers to 
actions of the Tribal Court, not of the parties. No such bad faith exists 
here. This action concerns tribal property, not non-Indian fee land, an 
important distinction discussed in Waterwheel v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802 
(9th Cir. 2011). Affirmed.  
101. The Tulalip Tribes v. 2008 White Ford Econoline, et al., 
No. 2012–0404, 2013 WL 2397948 (Tulalip C.A. 2013). Vehicle owner 
filed pro se appeal of order of the Tribal Court, which ordered forfeiture of 
van to Tribes under civil forfeiture provisions. The appellate court held that 
(1) owner was not entrapped by police into meeting on reservation, 
and (2) excessive fines clause of Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) applied to 
civil forfeiture proceedings. Remanded. 
102. State of Washington v. Clark, No. 87376–3, 2013 WL 
3864298 (Wash. 2013). Defendant, Clark, an enrolled member of 
confederated tribes, was convicted in the Superior Court of first-degree 
theft. He appealed, challenging a denial of his Motion to Suppress 
evidence that was seized from his residence on tribal trust land. The 
appellate court, 167 Wash. App. 667, 274 P.3d 1058, affirmed. Defendant 
petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme 
Court held that (1) the state had jurisdiction over the alleged theft, which 
occurred on fee land within the borders of a reservation, and (2) the state 
did not infringe the sovereignty of the tribes by issuing and executing a 
warrant to search defendant’s residence. Affirmed. 
103. Dish Network Service L.L.C. v. Laducer, et al., No. 12–
2871, 2013 WL 3970245 (8th Cir. 2013). Satellite-television-service 
provider, Dish Network Service, brought action to enjoin tribal court from 
conducting trial on abuse-of-process claim brought by enrolled member of 
Turtle Mountain Band of the Chippewa Indians. Provider moved for 
preliminary injunction. The District Court, 2012 WL 2782585, denied 
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motion. Provider appealed. The appellate court held that (1) provider 
would not suffer irreparable harm in absence of preliminary injunction, and 
(2) provider failed to demonstrate likelihood of success on merits of its 
claim that tribal court lacked jurisdiction. Affirmed. 
L. Tax 
104. Miccosukee Tribe Of Indians Of Florida v. United States, 
No. 11–14825, 698 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2012). Tribe petitioned to quash 
summons issued by Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service to third-
party financial institutions to determine whether tribe had complied with 
federal withholding requirements on grounds of sovereign immunity, 
improper purpose, relevance, bad faith, and overbreadth. The District 
Court, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1344, and 2011 WL 3300164, denied petitions, 
and 2011 WL 5508802, denied tribe’s Motion to Stay pending appeal. 
Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that (1) tribe could not rely on 
tribal sovereign immunity to quash summonses; (2) summonses were 
issued for proper purpose; and (3) tribe lacked standing to challenge third-
party summonses as overbroad. Affirmed. 
105. Miller v. Wright, No. 11-35850, 2012 WL 5477103 (9th Cir. 
2012).  Native American cigarette retailer and his customers brought 
action against Indian tribe, tribal chairman, and head of tribe’s tax 
department alleging that imposition of cigarette sales taxes by tribe on 
non-Native-Americans in Indian country pursuant to agreement between 
State of Washington and tribe was illegal. The District Court, 2011 WL 
4712245, dismissed action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of 
tribe’s sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court held 
that (1) tribe did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity by entering into 
cigarette tax contract with State of Washington; (2) tribe did not implicitly 
waive its sovereign immunity by agreeing to dispute resolution 
procedures; (3) tribal immunity was not preempted by federal antitrust 
laws; (4) tribe’s sovereign immunity extended to its officials; (5) Ex Parte 
Young barred Complaint to extent that plaintiffs sought monetary relief; 
and (6) res judicata barred action. Affirmed. 
106. Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, No. S–14513, 
295 P.3d 374 (Alaska 2013). Taxpayer, Williams, who received a grant to 
rebuild his house from the Bureau of Indian Affairs Housing Improvement 
Program and subsequently executed a deed of trust securing federal 
government’s right to repayment under grant with property. The Superior 
Court affirmed borough’s ruling that William’s house was not exempt from 
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borough property taxation. The Supreme Court held that real property and 
improvements were not exempt from borough taxation. Affirmed.  
107. King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc.; Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, v. McKenna, Attorney 
General of the State of Washington, No. 11–3018, 2013 WL 1403342 
(E.D. Wash. 2013). In the mid–1990s, Washington and several other 
states sued cigarette manufacturers, seeking to protect public health and 
recover costs and other damages incurred by the states due to smoking-
related illnesses. In 1998, the litigation resulted in The Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) between 46 states and tobacco product manufacturers 
(OPM). Pursuant to the MSA, the OPMs obtained release of specified past 
and future tobacco-related claims against them in exchange for an 
agreement to make substantial annual cash payments to the states in 
perpetuity to offset the burden that their cigarettes impose or will impose 
on the public health system. The MSA carves out three different groups of 
manufacturers:  the OPM, Subsequent Participating Manufacturers, and 
Non–Participating Manufacturers (NPM). The Washington Legislature 
adopted a Qualifying Statute. See Wash. Rev. Code § 70.157.005. 
Washington’s Statute requires all NPMs to make payments into qualified 
escrow accounts or join the MSA. The Qualifying Statute, therefore, 
requires tobacco product manufacturer Plaintiff King Mountain Tobacco, 
an NPM, to either join the MSA or deposit funds into escrow, based on the 
amount of their cigarette sales, that the State would obtain access to in 
the event of a future settlement or judgment against King Mountain. 
Plaintiff King Mountain engages in a multistate business growing tobacco 
and manufacturing cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco. The business 
involves (1) shipping King Mountain tobacco to Tennessee, where it is 
threshed; (2) shipping tobacco to North Carolina, where King Mountain 
tobacco is blended with North Carolina grown (Alliance One) tobacco; 
(3) transporting the blended tobacco on its trucks from North Carolina 
back to Washington; (4) advertising its cigarettes in multiple states through 
trade shows and the Internet; and (5) selling its cigarettes (through a 
distributor) to retail stores throughout Washington (and multiple other 
states) that ultimately sell cigarettes to consumers. The court found that 
the finished cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco are not directly derived 
from trust land, King Mountain can prove no set of facts in support of the 
claim that Washington’s escrow statutes are in conflict with the Treaty or 
federal law which would entitle Plaintiffs to relief. Escrow is required for all 
non-exempt sales subject to the State’s cigarette taxes, regardless 
whether those sales occur on or off the reservation. Escrow is not required 
for tax exempt King Mountain sales of cigarettes purchased directly by 
enrolled members of federally recognized Indian tribes from an Indian 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014 
 
430 
 
tribal jurisdiction of the member’s tribe for the member’s own use. If there 
were any past sales that were exempt from state excise tax, but for which 
King Mountain has deposited money into escrow anyway, King Mountain 
failed to offer evidence in support of a refund claim and the court 
expresses no opinion concerning the same. 
108. City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc., et 
al., No. 08–03966, 2013 WL 3187049 (E.D. N.Y. 2013). Before the court 
were the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment. The City of New York 
(the City) initiated this action against the above-captioned Defendants, 
individuals and businesses engaged in the sale of cigarettes from the 
Poospatuck Indian Reservation in Mastic, New York (the “Poospatuck 
Reservation” or the “Reservation), where members of the Unkechauge 
Indian Nation reside. The City contended principally that Defendants 
violated the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act (CCTA), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2341 et seq., and the Cigarette Marketing Standards Act (CMSA), N.Y. 
Tax Law § 483 et seq., by engaging in bulk re-sales of cigarettes on which 
State and City taxes had not been paid (unstamped cigarettes) to the 
public, either directly or through trafficker intermediaries. The Court 
granted the City summary judgment as to Defendants’ liability under the 
CCTA and the CMSA. With respect to relief, the court (1) granted the 
requested permanent injunction against Defendants’ “purchase, receipt, 
possession, sale, distribution, offer and advertisement of unstamped 
cigarettes-even to tribe members for personal use” and (2) awarded 
damages as against the Peace Pipe and TDM Defendants. 
109. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, et al., 
Nos. 12–1727, 12–1735, 2013 WL 3491285 (2nd Cir. July 15, 2013). 
Indian tribe brought action challenging town’s imposition of state’s 
personal property tax on lessors of slot machines used by tribe at casino. 
State intervened. The District Court, 2012 WL 1069342, entered summary 
judgment in tribe’s favor, and state and town appealed. The appellate 
court held that (1) tribe had standing to bring action; (2) Tax Injunction Act 
(TIA) did not bar action; (3) District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to dismiss action under principles of comity; and (4) Indian 
Trader Statutes and Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) did not 
preempt town’s imposition of tax. Reversed and remanded. 
110. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, et al. 
v. Thurston County Board of Equalization, et al., No. 10–35642, 2013 
WL 3888429 (9th Cir. 2013). Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis 
Reservation and lessee brought action against Thurston County, 
challenging assessment of property taxes on leased property. Cross-
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Motions for Summary Judgment were filed. The District Court, 2010 WL 
1406524, awarded summary judgment to county, finding that state and 
local governments were not prohibited from taxing permanent 
improvements, like resort on leased property, that were owned by non-
Indians, and 2010 WL 2595232, denied in part tribe’s Motion to Amend. 
Tribe and lessee appealed. On appeal, the appellate court held that land 
and permanent improvements on land were exempt from state and local 
taxation. Reversed. 
M. Trust Breach and Claims 
111. Segura v. Colombe, et al., No. 11–0926, 2012 WL 4715271 
(D.N.M. 2012). Arrestee, Segura, brought action against board of county 
commissioners, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983 and the New Mexico 
Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) following arrest by tribal police officer who was 
appointed and commissioned as a county deputy sheriff. Board moved for 
summary judgment. The court held that (1) officer was not a law 
enforcement officer under the NMTCA; (2) officer was an independent 
contractor; and (3) board did not have immediate supervisory 
responsibilities over officer. Motion granted in part and denied in part. 
112. Jackson, et al. v. United States, No. 11–671, 2012 WL 
5873669 (Fed. Cl. 2012). Members of Indian tribe brought suit against the 
United States in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, 
alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The District Court 
granted summary judgment against tribe members as to negligence 
claims, but transferred breach of fiduciary duty claims to Court of Federal 
Claims. Defendant Moved for Judgment on the pleadings. The Court of 
Federal Claims held that (1) claims filed simultaneously were “pending” 
claims under statute limiting jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, 
and (2) Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over transferred claims, 
because they arose out of same operative facts as pending, 
nontransferred claims. Dismissed. 
113. The Northern Cheyenne Tribe, v. The Roman Catholic 
Church, et al., No. 12-0010, 2013 WL 433180 (Mont. 2013). The Northern 
Cheyenne Indian tribe brought action against Catholic school located on 
reservation and against Catholic diocese, alleging numerous claims, 
including unjust enrichment, and seeking to impose constructive trust on 
funds raised by school using direct mail containing images of poverty 
among tribe members. The District Court entered summary judgment in 
favor of school and diocese, and Tribe appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that (1) tribe was not required to prove that school had committed a 
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wrongful act in order to support unjust enrichment claim, and (2) trial court, 
in determining running of statute of limitations, was required to determine 
when tribe received notice that school had asserted an adverse interest as 
to funds. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
114. Spirit Lake Tribe of Indians, et al. v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n., No. 12–2292, 715 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2013). Spirit Lake 
Tribe of Indians sued national association governing collegiate sports, 
alleging race discrimination under § 1981, and seeking to enjoin 
association from interfering with state university’s use of “Fighting Sioux” 
name, logo, and imagery. The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of association. Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that (1) tribe 
failed to show that association acted with discriminatory intent, and 
(2) under North Dakota law, contract to use name was not created by 
ceremony. Affirmed. 
115. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, No. 02-25L (Fed. 
Cl. 2013). This Indian trust case was before the court following an 
extensive trial in Washington, D.C. In this case, the Jicarilla Apache 
Nation (the Nation) sought an accounting and to recover for monetary 
losses and damages relating to the government’s alleged breach of 
fiduciary duties in mismanaging the Nation’s trust assets and other funds. 
Specifically, the Nation alleged that the United States (1) failed to invest 
Jicarilla’s trust monies prudently so as to obtain an appropriate return; 
(2) made certain unauthorized disbursements of Jicarilla’s trust monies; 
(3) took too long to deposit funds received for Jicarilla into interest-bearing 
trust accounts; and (4) charged Jicarilla interest for covering overdrafts on 
Jicarilla’s trust accounts that were caused by the United States. The court 
found that Plaintiff demonstrated that, during the period from February 22, 
1974, to September 30, 1992, defendant breached its fiduciary duties to 
the Nation by mismanaging the Nation’s trust assets and other funds; and 
that Plaintiff established all the traditional elements for recovery of 
damages on those breach claims. Based on the foregoing, the court found 
that, for the period in question, Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the 
amount of $21,017,491.99 – $21,015,651.45 on its underinvestment claim 
and $1,840.54 for its deposit lag claim. Plaintiff was entitled to recover 
nothing on its negative interest claim, which claim was dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction.  
116. Goodeagle, et al. v. United States, No. 12–431, 2013 WL 
3724927 (Fed. Cl. 2013). Members of Quapaw Tribe (Tribe) brought 
action against federal government, seeking to recover money damages 
arising from government’s alleged breach of fiduciary and trust obligations 
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owed to Tribe and its members. Government moved for partial dismissal 
of Complaint. The Court of Federal Claims held that  (1) claims seeking to 
recover losses stemming from mismanagement of trust fund accrued 
when Department of Interior accepted tribe’s analysis as final accounting; 
(2) government was not entitled to more definite statement of members’ 
claim for mismanagement of trust fund; (3) Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) did not preempt 
members’ claim for mismanagement of natural resources; (4) claims for 
mismanagement of natural resources did not represent continuing 
trespass; (5) claims that government violated fiduciary duties by failing to 
protect members or to act in their best interest were untimely; and 
(6) members’ alternative takings claim was premature. Motion granted in 
part and denied in part.  
117. Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, No. 12–529, 
2013 WL 3724944 (Fed. Cl. 2013). Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma brought 
claim against federal government, seeking money damages arising from 
government’s alleged breach of fiduciary and trust obligations owed to 
tribe. Government moved for partial dismissal of Complaint. The Court of 
Federal Claims held that (1) tribe satisfied notice pleading requirement for 
claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty through mismanagement of tribe’s 
trust accounts; (2) tribe failed to identify any provision of law violated by 
government’s deed of trust land to church; (3) tribe’s claims for losses due 
to mismanagement of trust funds accrued when Department of Interior 
accepted tribe’s analysis as final accounting; and (4) tribe’s claim that 
government mismanaged natural resources on trust land was untimely. 
Motion granted in part and denied in part.  
  
